Antonia Baraggia

Antonia Baraggia is Postdoctoral Fellow and Lecturer in Constitutional Law at University of Milan (Italy), Department of National and Supranational Public Law. She lectures on Social Rights Protection in a multilevel perspective within the LLM program on Sustainable Development at University of Milan.

She has been Visiting Research Fellow at Fordham University, School of Law and Visiting Scholar at University of Fribourg (Switzerland). She holds a PhD in Public Law from University of Turin. She serves as one of the members of the Editorial Staff of the Italian Journal of Public Law. She is also member of the

Antonia’s expertise lies at the intersection of Comparative Constitutional Law, European Union law and Human Rights. Her research interests include the role of courts, the Eurozone crisis, Constitutional change and social rights protection considered in a comparative perspective.

She authored a book on Higher Education in Europe and in Italy and several publications in Italian and in English on the effects of the financial crisis on national constitutional systems and on the European Union, on the economic conditionality, on fundamental rights protection in comparative perspective and on the dialogue among Courts.

Research Project

Rethinking Economic Conditionality Within The Eu Legal Framework: A Constitutional Perspective. Economic conditionality is a controversial tool, mainly studied by international scholars with regards to the International Monetary Fund’s and World Bank’s activity. After the eruption of the Eurozone crisis, economic conditionality assumed a prominent role also within the EU in the form of  sovereign-debt related conditionality. Despite its constitutionalization within the EU legal framework, sovereign-debt conditionality in the EU still lies in a sort of legal limbo, with regard to its legal nature and legitimacy.  Moreover, although the principle of conditionality can be found in the constitution of several federal or composite states, constitutional scholars also have paid little attention to this principle. Given this fragmented constellation, we can formulate our research hypothesis as such: can economic conditionality be rethought as a legitimate tool of economic governance in composite states (EU and federal states) through a constitutional approach, going beyond the flaws and the inconsistencies that such a tool has revealed? The research will attempt to tackle the EU conditionality’s inherent flaws - both substantial and procedural. Despite the wide attention given to the flaws of the EU’s response to the Eurozone crisis, a solution to its inconsistencies was and still is hard to find. This is due, also, to what I refer to as the “trap of economic conditionality”: scholars’ debate has been very much focused on the international law paradigm which emphasizes the inherent contradiction between conditionality and State sovereignty, being trapped into this unresolvable dilemma. The EU case is different: there we have a certain degree of integration between member states, as well as a monetary and an economic union which bounds the destinies of Member States to each other. Thus, it becomes crucial to reach a deeper understanding of the concept under a constitutional perspective in order to tackle its inconsistencies at the EU level.