



Whose Europe is it anyway? The 1998 Stein Rokkan lecture

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Abstract. This article addresses the issue of whether a model of deep European integration might be envisaged in a continent-wide process that might accompany eastern enlargement of the European Union. The paper argues that deep integration in Western Europe has been built on three dimensions: the functional; the territorial; and affiliational. The articulation of these three dimensions has evolved through not only the EU, but also a dense pattern of other transnational linkages, including those between immediate neighbours. Moreover, different west European countries have been linked into this process through varied patterns for ‘domesticating’ Europe. Efforts to develop an EU polity require the interplay of all three dimensions of integration, a tough goal for post-cold-war Europe in the western part of the continent, let alone in ‘pan-Europe’.

Introduction

It is almost a decade since the Berlin Wall came down – a decade in which there have been huge changes across the European continent. Yet it still remains very unclear what the shape of transnational relations will be in this new ‘pan-Europe’.¹ And it also remains very unclear whether a form of ‘pan-European’ integration is feasible or politically probable. The practitioners’ debate remains rather conventionally focused on the questions of whether and how to extend eastwards transnational organisations, built originally by and for west Europeans. Most of that debate is about the logistics of enlarging the European Union (EU) and NATO, both set in train in early 1998. It is easy to criticise the practitioners for their unadjusted mindsets. But there are many in the academic community who are similarly groping for a new understanding of pan-Europe. It is tempting, and much easier, to stay locked into the familiar paradigms of the old – and divided – Europe.

The underlying puzzle to be resolved has at least three elements. First, how many Europes are we talking about? A new research programme funded in Britain by the Economic and Social Research Council is for this reason entitled *One Europe or several?* Second, what really is the distinctiveness of the model of west European integration, defined below as *deep* integ-

ration? An answer to this question seems a necessary preliminary to considering whether the same pattern of integration is feasible for pan-Europe. Third, what is the role of 'Europe' within the politics of individual countries. Or, in other words, how should we construe the domestication of Europe? This lecture addresses each of these three elements in an effort to clarify the discussion about the emerging transnational features of the new Europe.

The discussion that follows is prompted in part by a personal intellectual journey, as well as by the experience of a citizen in Britain, a country that has not easily come to terms with Europeanisation. My own starting position was sympathetic to the old neofunctionalist argument that west European integration was propelled by the interactions between political and economic elites across country boundaries in pursuit of some mix of shared ideas and complementary interests (Haas 1968; Lindberg 1963). This presupposed that bargained reciprocities (diffuse and not just specific) could be sustained over time and facilitated by particular institutional processes. I was less persuaded of the argument that integration would lead to the creation of a supranational polity and I was always conscious of the *differences* between countries in the way that Europe was domesticated or instrumentalised. Nonetheless interest-based explanations seemed not to explain enough of the process to be wholly convincing.

However, I have become increasingly perplexed about what factors beyond the calculation of interests are necessary to permit – or to sustain – an interlocking of elite engagements, once the background conditions have altered. The issue here is less the 'turbulence' caused by 'dramatic political' personalities,² and rather what might be the impact on integration of the systemic turbulence in Europe over the past decade. It is this concern that has driven me back to contemplate Karl Deutsch's (1957) wide-ranging analysis of integration and the many factors which he argued were needed to create an 'amalgamated security community'. His argument both insisted on the importance of the societal dimension and asserted that extensive integration had to include some notion of a shared sense of security.

In a similarly ambitious vein Stein Rokkan (1975 – and more or less *passim*) evaluated a broad range of factors that shaped the political fabric of contemporary Europe. For him notions of territory and boundaries, and of core and peripherae, were crucial, as well as a daunting range of factors, from the military-administrative through the political and economic to the societal and cultural. For him the prefix 'geo' was crucial as a qualification of each of his key variables. It is a perplexing irony of post-cold-war Europe that we have all been forced to rediscover issues of territory and of boundaries, that the melting of that stark division between east and west should have revealed so many other disconcerting and difficult borders. It is a paradox too that so

many practitioners should be tempted to create so many new borders. Hence it is particularly appropriate that the occasion of a lecture in memory of Stein Rokkan should be the prompt for an effort to examine my puzzle about whose Europe and what kind of Europe and how many Europes.

How many Europes?

This question needs to be approached from two different angles, one more empirical and the other more analytical. The main empirical point here is that we too easily exaggerate the simplicity of the transnational organisation of western Europe. Hence we too easily transpose on to central and eastern Europe a reversed mirror image based on this misleading simplification, implying a contrast between a relatively homogeneous western Europe and a fragmented and segmented eastern Europe. But western Europe is also a set of multiple Europes, in which both the role of the EU as the predominant transnational organisation and the coherence of west European integration and multilateralism are much overstated.

The oversimplified contrast of west and east disguises several important points. First, the EU has throughout its history coexisted with a different and larger transnational framework for managing west European security interests, namely NATO. There has been a relationship and, I would argue, an interdependence, between the two frameworks. This is not intended as a reductionist observation to adduce 'geopolitics' as the key variable, a position so fiercely attacked by Moravcsik (1998), but rather an insistence on a kind of synergy between the two domains. Moreover the defence relationships in western Europe have been underpinned by a whole array of other relationships, not only Western European Union (WEU), but other bilateral and multilateral linkages among individual countries.

Second, there have since the 1940s always been several 'outlier' countries in western Europe, not fully engaged in either the EU or NATO or outside both organisations. These outliers have been mostly located around the peripherae of western Europe, although Switzerland is a centrally located outlier. With the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) enlargement of the EU and the arrangements for partial association of some 'non-aligned' countries with WEU, the ranks of explicit outliers have shrunk.³ Some would argue that the later-joiners of the EU include some outliers, inside more in form than in spirit. In contrast there is a west European core group of countries, larger in membership than the six founder members of the European Community (EC), but less than the current EU membership. The notion of a core western Europe, or 'little Europe' (Delors 1992) has indeed been articulated by some practitioners, especially since 1989, as an operational organising principle.

Also we might note that it is the south eastern and north western corners of western Europe that have been most difficult to embrace in the west European integration process. The north-west matters less in this context than the south-east, at the interface between Europe and 'non-Europe' and hence a real test for integration, as Rokkan (1975) might have argued.

Third, transnational western Europe has consisted of a series of interlocking relationships between particular neighbours, in groupings with different focal points and characteristics. Some are straightforward to list: Benelux, the Franco-German partnership; the Nordic family; the tangled British-Irish interdependency – each with varying degrees of organisation and each marked by points of tension as well as by points of alignment. Others are less defined: the Dutch-German relationship; or almost invisible: the Portuguese-Spanish relationship; or marked by contestation: the Greek-Turkish relationship. These various groupings form the sub-structure of the wider west European pattern of relationships, and its external interfaces. Arguably without these interlocking groupings the fabric of broader integration would be less strong. The fabric of integration seems weakest in those parts of western Europe where the local connections are more differentiated, whether explicitly contested (Greece-Turkey) or ambiguously articulated (as in the Nordic region). Conversely the fabric of integration seems strongest in those parts where the links between neighbours have been most densely cumulative, mainly in the heartland of 'core' western Europe.

Fourth, over the past decade there have been both some newly emerging groupings between neighbours and some sharp fissures within previously co-organised countries. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia and of Yugoslavia are obvious, though different, examples of the latter. The disaggregation of Belgium is a west European example of fission. More encouragingly there is an engaging intensity of new linkages in the Baltic region. Less intense, but interesting, linkages are being built in the Black Sea region. In south-central Europe, some would say in Hapsburg Europe, another pattern of linkages is emerging. New channels of interaction are beginning to link Poland with Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania. Each of Germany's eastern neighbours is feeling its way towards a more constructive relationship with Germany, echoing west European experiences of fifty years ago. These various forms of new bilateralism and multilateralism are perhaps the most dynamic feature of cross-border engagement, with echoes at the local (cross-border) and the private levels as well. Yet many of these new groupings straddle – and are perhaps in tension with – the planned phases of NATO and EU enlargement. These risk emphasising borders counterproductively, for example to the east of Poland, or around Hungary. Boundary issues are thus crucial in the re-configuration of Europe.

This variegated pattern reveals several different transnational Europes, serving a mixture of functional, territorial and affiliational purposes. Where functional, territorial and affiliational purposes overlap and have been combined and institutionalised we can identify a pattern of *deep* integration. Part of the cement for this derives from bilateral relationships between countries, through ‘multiple bilateralism’, as Rummel (1982) phrased it. Elsewhere we observe forms of shallow or partial or soft integration.

In the analysis that follows these three categories are, first, briefly explained, and, second, interpreted in the context of systemic change in post-cold-war Europe. To stylise the discussion a little these three functions can also be related to particular schools of intellectual analysis. Thus the functional dimension comprises the areas of substantive concern across the arenas of public policy and private exchange, especially economic, commercial, industrial, environmental and physical resources, and some elements of social welfare. This is the ground defined by Haas and other neofunctionalists, now also claimed by those (such as Moravcsik) who assert that the collective regimes to serve national preferences on economic issues are at the heart of west European integration. The territorial dimension comprises: issues to do with security, internal as well as external; relations with contiguous neighbours; and the management of borders, within and at the edges of the system. This is where Rokkan has made such a large contribution to our understanding. The affiliational dimension includes questions of values, ideas, identity, and culture, those factors that appear to distinguish the affiliated from the non-affiliated or ‘other’, and which feed into the societal dimension of politics. It was on these issues that Deutsch’s transactional approach sought to clarify our understanding.

It is around these three dimensions that we can plot the different patterns of transnational linkages in western Europe. Some linkages have been mainly focused on one dimension, while others have been two- or three-dimensional. What is distinctive about the inheritance of west European transnationalism is that so much has been institutionalised across all three dimensions. However, we should still recall that this three-dimensional pattern has been articulated through different institutional frameworks and by different actors.

The functional dimension

What we now know as the European Union is the prime and most extended arena for functional cooperation. It is multi-scope and with extending and now extensive scope. It reflects the limits to the functional autonomy of individual countries, as Scharpf (1997 and 1998) has so elegantly argued. It has been responsive to changing definitions of functional needs emanating from both public policy debate and shifts in the patterns of private exchanges. It

is also often analysed, we should recall, in the languages of agency and of interests.

Yet, we should remember, the EU does not monopolise functional cooperation between its member countries, nor are all of the boundaries to functional cooperation coterminous with the boundaries of EU membership. An array of other functional arenas coexist with the EU: some are a consequence of geography – for example, river and marine management; others relate to industrial and technological capabilities, as in European space cooperation; others are narrowly confined to a single technical sector, as in Eurocontrol for aviation traffic management. Throughout past decades the combining European economy always spread wider than the boundaries of the EU, hence the development in the 1980s of the European Economic Area or the various association arrangements between the EU and non-member neighbours. And, of course, hence a parallel array of private linkages between economic agents, and to a lesser extent social agents – what some have called informal integration (Wallace 1991).

In addition some functional linkages have developed much more closely within smaller groups, reflecting differences in local interchange. Between Britain and Ireland or in the Nordic region there is, for example, extensive free movement of labour, in striking contrast to most of the rest of western Europe. Similarly we should note the lack of vigorous functional linkages between some immediate neighbours, notably in the Iberian peninsula and between Greece and Turkey. In the first of these cases functional interchange seems to have been prompted by EU membership (Inotai 1997). In the second case, functional exchanges developed over many centuries have been severely disrupted in the twentieth century.

The territorial dimension

A neglected element in the commentary on European integration is the development of so many transnational linkages in western Europe to address the local territorial concerns of individual countries. Primary among these was the concern to regulate the boundary with immediate neighbours, a key concern for Germany and its neighbours, and an overriding concern for the west European neighbours of the Soviet Union. Both NATO and the EU have served as safety nets for the peaceful management of intra-west European borders, with distinctive forms of non-alignment in central and northern Europe as a reassurance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. These border security issues, at least in the past, have been as pertinent as the conventional systemic security issues. Even today there are still tensions in the Dutch–German and Danish–German relationships, which weigh in the consideration of Dutch and Danish European policies. In the Nordic region borders between countries

still represent borders between differences both of policy and of political culture.

A second territorial concern was propelled by the cold war, which promoted the consolidation of the various west European frameworks to defend western Europe as a whole against the *imperium* of the Soviet Union over the countries that it dominated in central and eastern Europe. Formally the west European alliance was orchestrated by NATO and the WEU, but the need to engage West Germany at the heart of this alliance was served by the role of the then EC as a reassurance mechanism for neighbouring countries vis-à-vis Germany. Somewhat different arrangements operated at the interface with the USSR in the Nordic region, where defensive non-alignment complemented and provided a buffer for NATO. It was in the south eastern corner of 'western' Europe that the synergy between NATO and the EC failed to operate. Greece and Turkey both have long been full members of NATO, but have failed to find a *modus vivendi* within the contemporary EU. The consequence is a persistently troubled relationship between Turkey and the rest of Europe (Barchard 1998).

A third contribution was provided by these territorial safety nets in western Europe. With the benefit of hindsight it has become evident that the strong articulation of the military alliance, and the management of sensitive borders that accompanied it, also served to control borders for internal security purposes. The impermeability of the cold war boundary along the central spine of Europe was a barrier against all kinds of potentially disturbing incomers, as was the active naval presence in the Mediterranean sea. Individual west European countries could pursue distinct national policies behind this shared set of territorial barriers. These barriers made unnecessary an explicit policy about the regulation of the eastern boundaries, and enabled west Europeans to be increasingly relaxed about their internal borders (comforted also by the low levels of labour movement inside western Europe).

The affiliational dimension

Western Europe, or most of western Europe, also developed several shared focal points of social and political affiliation in the period following the second world war. These had three relatively explicit and distinct components. One was the shared value set around the variants of liberal democratic political systems that developed across western Europe, an important focus of transnational reassurance, and a guide for the management of relationships with west European countries emerging from authoritarian rule, especially relevant in southern Europe. In institutional terms this was expressed most expli-

city through the Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights.

The value set was only implicit and barely articulated within the EC/EU. The Treaty of Rome (1957) had simply noted that 'any European state' could apply for EU membership (Article 237, EEC). The 1977 *Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on Fundamental Rights* was a rather feeble attempt at a rhetorical statement of shared democratic values. Not until the Treaty on European Union (Article F), agreed at Maastricht in 1991, did the member governments note that their states were founded 'on the principles of democracy' and their 'respect for fundamental rights'. Only in 1997 at Amsterdam did they further clarify Article F to read that the 'Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law'. Applicants would have to respect these principles (Article O) and existing members might in extremis be suspended for breaching them. What a paradox that it should have taken so long to put this into treaty form.

A second shared affiliation was, to put it simply, around anti-communism as an ideological rallying point. This served a dual purpose. On the one hand it allowed the partial incorporation of autocratic regimes in Portugal, Greece, and Turkey within various of the west European transnational organisations, especially NATO. On the other hand, there was an implicit warning against the inclusion of communist parties inside governing coalitions in west European countries, especially relevant at various moments in relation to Greek and Italian politics.

A third shared affiliation was linked to the socio-economic compacts developed within individual west European countries in complementarity with, and a stimulus to, the political economy mode of EC integration. In the 1950s and 1960s there was an apparent synergy between these and a shared goal of socio-economic modernisation, for which the EC could be argued to be a vehicle. Initially, however, the narrative was more implicit than explicit. Again a paradox the discourse about the 'European social model' began to be articulated only in the late 1980s in parallel with the shift towards a collective neo-liberal economic stance of market liberalisation in the EC (Leibfried & Pierson 1995; Kapteyn 1996; Scharpf 1997; Streeck 1997).

It can be argued that these focal points of affiliation were vaguely stated and perhaps only ambiguously understood, not least in allowing important country variations to persist under the umbrella of apparent transnational cooperation. Much more evidence remains to be collated on the discursive narratives of the early years of west European integration, a field of enquiry which is beginning to yield valuable insights into the more recent period (see, for example, Diez, forthcoming; Risse et al. 1998). Nonetheless the appeal to

these focal points was a distinctive feature of efforts to integrate in western Europe. It particularly sharply distinguished western Europe from that *other* Europe to the east, an *other* Europe that also drew on, and was reinforced by, a whole series of images of otherness in the eastern part of the continent and its peripherae yet further east, south east and to the south. These focal points of affiliation were important constituents of the 'permissive consensus' from which west European integration for so long benefited.

On the other hand, the ambiguities in the articulation of these shared points of affiliation provided a base for only rather soft forms of collective policy. Within western Europe the freedom of social interchange, with its many manifestations of popular and cultural transactions, gave the impression, but perhaps only the impression, of a shared social and cultural space. Its force derived much from the contrast with that other Europe, with such opposite characteristics, namely of blocked social, cultural and popular transactions between west and east, as well as among the central and east European countries.

These caveats about the ambiguous affiliational dimension notwithstanding, it seems to be the combination of the three dimensions – functional, territorial and affiliational – that has induced a form of *deep* integration in western Europe. It has led many, both commentators and practitioners, to conflate the three dimensions into a single model of integration. Yet this seems to be an over-simplification. The argument in this lecture is rather that it was the ability to develop these three dimensions through an array of different frameworks that produced in western Europe specific transnational patterns of integration.

This is not to suggest that these different frameworks have necessarily been autonomous or that the different dimensions of integration have not impacted on each other. Many of the same west European states are involved in all of the frameworks and have built relationships with each other that operate on all three dimensions. There is thus an overlay of connections, as well as the utilisation of parallel frameworks for differing purposes. Moreover, one can observe a pattern of 'club' behaviour – those within the west Europe transnational process have developed club privileges for insiders, and thus forms of discrimination against those outside. The EU is by far the most articulated version of this – a transnational organisation with clear functional goals, embedded in a wider setting with territorial and affiliational dimensions, but not able fully to absorb those territorial and affiliational dimensions. NATO was another club, its membership restricted to those prepared to go to war for and with each other.

One interesting feature of the past decade has been the debate over whether the shift from EC to EU should incorporate all three dimensions to integra-

tion within a single framework. Both the so-called second (common foreign and security policy) and third (justice and home affairs) pillars touch on the territorial dimension (both external and internal) outlined above. The recent articulation in the EU of some core principles of democracy and the sketching of elements of 'European citizenship' assert the importance of the affiliational dimension. Indeed the effort to draw the three dimensions under one framework seems to have reinforced the 'club' characteristics of the EU. Nowhere is the case for retained club privileges more vehemently asserted than in the discussion of eastern and southern enlargement. This is a conservative and conservationist feature of the EU, technically articulated in the defence of the *acquis communautaire*, as shorthand for the club rules.

Contrasting legacies in central and eastern Europe

Before 1989 it is hard to find equivalent forms of transnationalism and multilateralism in central and eastern Europe. The cross-country *functional* linkages consisted of hub-and-spoke relationships to the Soviet Union; they were not productive of neighbour-to-neighbour contacts, interdependencies or agency relationships. Moreover the then economic system removed the scope for organic linkages relating to functional transactions. The cross-country *territorial* linkages and contestations were frozen within an oppressive and armed authoritarianism. This provided little opportunity for boundaries to be reconsidered or for societal connections to change the consequences of the inherited boundary structure. The *affiliational* dimension was subsumed within the tensions of an imposed ideology. Again here we should note the absence of vectors to carry across central and eastern Europe new and converging patterns of political and societal values and attitudes. Instead alternative focal points of affiliation were mostly country-bound or ethnic community-based, or sometimes underpinned by religion.

Central and east European countries have thus had to invent transnationalism more or less from scratch, with the apparent beacon of a multilateral Europe that they might join or rejoin, and with a horribly difficult set of eastern and south eastern boundary questions to complicate the issues across all three dimensions of function, territory and affiliation. It was so much easier for west Europeans that they had a great stretch of ocean to the west!

To summarise, in western Europe we can observe the appearance of a single system, but one which was actually constructed through a series of interlocking and overlapping groupings and institutions. The apparent coherence of those arrangements was partly a consequence of the distinction from the other Europe, a distinction that has lost its clarity since 1989. Meanwhile in central and eastern Europe we can observe a segmented history, followed by recent attempts to define European engagement by achieving incorporation

within the west European-defined transnational system. This move 'towards' western Europe is now beginning, but only beginning, to be flanked by more local patterns of linkage. There are also the tragic instances of de-linkage where (joint functions) task, territory and (affiliation) trust are all contested.

How then should we characterise deep integration?

What lessons can we derive for the feasibility of a pan-European variant?

West European experience reveals a distinctive pattern of integration: multi-framework, multi-layer, multi-lateral, and multi-purpose. The pattern has included a variety of shared functional regimes; it has protected both individual and collective territorial boundaries; and it has built on several different focal points of affiliation, which were reinforced by the ideological and military division of Europe. Also, there were connections (see further below) between west European integration and wider global developments.

But it was not only the complementarity of the functional, territorial and affiliational dimensions that underpinned this deep integration. It was also nurtured by the particular pattern of institutionalisation that was established, especially the dense institutional fabric of the EU. Within and through the EU institutions a variety of political, economic and even some societal actors were able to mobilise, to bargain, and to consolidate both prevailing ideas and specific interests (Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch 1996). European law emerged as a powerful instrument of discipline to induce persistent cooperation and to turn diffuse and diverse shared commitments into concrete rules of behaviour (Burley & Mattli 1993). The EU arena proved especially apposite and useful as a way of mediating some west European relationships with the rest of the world, including with that other Europe to the east. And the EU arena also proved especially valuable as a framework for mediating relationships between EU countries. This EU arena was buttressed by an array of other institutionalised and especially elite-level connections. This amalgam of institutionalised engagements is now widely characterised as a special process of European governance (Armstrong & Bulmer 1998).

The way that the EU and its governance model developed had a number of important consequences for transnational linkages in western Europe. First, the EU provided a rather open opportunity structure for a variety of political, economic and societal actors to become engaged and to develop transnational connections. Societal linkages, however, were weakly developed, their sketchiness masked for a long time by the focal points of broader affiliation in western Europe. The EU's open opportunity structure particularly encouraged clientelistic and agency relationships, and ones that were more segmented

in pursuit of particular shared functions than aggregating across functions (Wallace & Young 1997). The relationships have been cognitive rather than affective in character.

Second, the EU did not need to be all-encompassing, since other west European frameworks and some of the smaller groupings of countries dealt with some of the other sensitive issues. Hence the curious dialectics of common foreign and security or defence policies in western Europe have been spread across different frameworks of cooperation. These have included not only the obvious and publicly visible organisations (NATO, WEU etc), but several more restricted and less public groupings. Both bilateral (notably Franco–German) and multilateral groupings have played a part, and there has been a kind of deliberate organisational redundancy which has permitted choices among different frameworks.

Third, though wide-ranging in its scope, the EU has left protected domestic political spaces in which national actors could pursue different country-level trajectories. Latterly Ireland and the Netherlands have been positive examples of the differentiated use of this protected domestic space, while Greece is the frequently quoted negative illustration. To be sure, where the line should be drawn between the country and the European arenas has been a recurrent subject of debate, but that different spaces should coexist has not as such been much contested. Within the jargon of the EU, discussion about which level of governance is appropriate is channeled into the discussion of ‘subsidiarity’. The academic literature contains competing accounts, some (such as Moravcsik 1998) arguing that individual states are still able to exercise strategic choices about when to delegate to the EU, others suggesting that the state has lost capabilities without the EU acquiring comparable powers (Scharpf 1997; Streeck 1997), and yet others (Wessels 1997) asserting that national systems have started to fuse at the transnational level.

Fourth, time scales and time perspectives have been important in conditioning attitudes about previous experiences and possible future behaviour. One part of the success of the EC in the early years was in establishing itself as a transformation-inducing framework for its participants. Another part of its success has been in structuring expectations about future cooperation, thus increasing the incentives for sustained engagement. Here too there are competing explanations in the literature, ranging between the more strategic manipulation of commitments (Moravcsik 1998) and the development of a form of collective identity (Risse et al. 1998; Sedelmeier 1998).

Fifth, but much more contentious, has been the persistence of ambitions on the part of some to turn the EU into a form of polity. This ambition has led its proponents and apologists to seek to ratchet up the content of EU cooperation and its institutional features. Thus the extension from market integration to

monetary integration signals an effort to endow the EU with more state-like features vis-à-vis the economy. The attempt to make the EU a security and defence arena would be to take on some of the territorial concerns hitherto addressed through the parallel NATO framework. Efforts to develop an EU capacity to address issues of justice and home affairs – and thus the internal security agenda – also suggest that the EU might become the focus for addressing much more explicitly some of the other territorial and boundary management concerns of its members. The discourse of polity-building implies that the EU itself could or should attract the transnational political and social affiliations hitherto more dispersed across different European arenas of cooperation (see, for example, Shaw 1997; Wiener 1998). This polity project presumes affective as well as cognitive loyalty on the part of its members, cognitive loyalty perhaps being sufficient to underpin shared governance.

Moreover by definition a polity-in-the-making becomes harder for others to join. Club privileges and club identity would logically have to be further reinforced; as Bartolini (1998) argues, the issues of exclusion and closure need much more thorough analysis. It is not so much that deep integration is incompatible with wide integration – the conventional argument – but that the concentration of all of the main dimensions of integration within a single EU framework reinforces the gulf between participants and non-participants *and* makes it harder to tolerate varying degrees of involvement. To make this leap towards a polity would indeed be to give the EU a quality quite different from other European frameworks and to presuppose that a more self-sufficient EU was no longer dependent on the coexistence and complementarity of other forms of transnational cooperation. Yet there is historical paradox here, in so far as the deep integration experiment drew so much from territorial and affiliational elements built out of the division of Europe.

Thus we have two related and subversive issues before us. One is whether the deep integration model of western Europe can be sustained in western Europe, let alone transformed into a polity, in our much altered historical conditions. And the second is whether central and eastern Europe (or some of the CEEC countries) can be envisaged as sufficiently linked on the three dimensions of integration to make deep integration in pan-Europe seem feasible and be made operational through strong shared institutions. Both issues beg a further question about the disjunction in stages of development between western and eastern Europe. It is a demanding challenge to create a continent-wide process of integration across countries with contextually and temporally quite different sequences of political, economic, and social development.

How then should we construe the domestication of Europe within the politics of individual countries?

It is self-evident that we cannot answer either the west European question or the pan-European question without more closely examining the way in which European integration plays into and emanates from the politics of individual west European countries. But the academic literature gives us inadequate handles on which to grasp. Let me target three deficiencies in the literature.

One is the overdrawn debate between those who see the European frameworks as essentially subordinate instruments for manipulation by national politicians and those who argue that European integration is the evidence of the lost autonomy of countries – intergovernmentalism versus fusion. My own preference is to navigate between these two camps rather to join either. To be sure, if countries had full autonomy and capability, European integration would be redundant. On the other hand if national politics were irrelevant European integration would not be so contested a process. A more satisfactory analysis must surely lie in a better understanding of the push-pull between the European and country levels of politics and governance.

A second deficiency in the literature lies in the absence of cross-country comparisons of the range of European connections and relationships that are pertinent to domestic politics. We can find comparisons of EU policies country by country, though not very many. We can find cross-country comparisons of foreign and defence policies, though again not very many. We can find cross-country comparisons in the patterns of ideological and political values and attitudes, but generally with slight references only to the European context. Studies of individual countries generally fail to address all the dimensions of European linkage that seep into national politics. Thus in my terms few national studies pay simultaneous attention to the transnational dimensions of function, territory and affiliation.

A third problem stems from the literature about globalisation with its strong presumption that globalisation erodes the political, economic and social options and opportunities available in national politics. We need to develop our understanding about how pressures of globalisation are factored into national politics and how they interact with the different ways of construing Europeanisation. Here incidentally we should also note the emerging fashion to conflate globalisation and Europeanisation, with Europeanisation seen by many as essentially a medium of globalisation rather than a differentiated phenomenon. There is a danger of misleading reductionism here.

Let me then attack my question about the domestication of Europe a different way. My earlier argument was that west European integration was composited from three dimensions of transnational linkage addressing questions of function, territory and affiliation. It follows that we should look for

markers in domestic politics that relate to all three dimensions. Thus we might expect to find different patterns of European connection depending on how participants in a national polity have viewed the utility and pertinence of the European arena to each dimension and the relevant country-level preoccupations and predicaments. I also argued earlier that European integration was built out of a series of differentiated country groupings, which we should similarly expect to see resonate in country-level politics. Moreover I also indicated that, European linkages notwithstanding, there were protected and persistent domestic political spaces, within which we might expect to see differences between countries. Thus, for example, we might also expect to find more synergy between country and European levels for some countries and more tensions for others. I also suggested that there were differences between core and peripheral countries in terms of the intensity of their engagement in the different dimensions of integration. Hence we should expect to find significant differences in the way the symbols and substance of European integration are appropriated in domestic political discourse and in domestic political practice (a point made strongly by Risse et al. 1998, but which, as they indicate, needs further empirical and analytical investigation). In addition we should expect to observe variations between countries in the patterns of domestic preference formation on European issues and differences in the way in which agents from individual countries engage in the transnational institutional processes.

To cut a much longer story short, this is precisely what we can observe in ranging across the 15 member countries of the EU, the slightly different 17 members of NATO, and the few countries that are currently in neither of these circles, although connected to several of the functional regimes or involved in other sub-continental groupings. Essentially what we can observe is that in those west European countries for which the functional, territorial and affiliational linkages are densely correlated we can identify a three-dimensional and thus wide-ranging European engagement. Germany seems historically to be the clearest example of this, as Moravcsik (1998) hints, but does not spell out. In these countries the European context frames very many of the choices in domestic politics and on the whole the debate is about *how* to utilise the European arena. In contrast in those west European countries where the linkages are strong on only one or two of my dimensions the political debate is about *when* and *whether* to utilise the European arena – not only about *how* to use it. A three dimensional engagement also generates more intensive elite interactions, which then become mutually reinforcing. Thus domestic preferences are more extensively conditioned by the interaction, the opportunities are greater to collude across country boundaries, and the voices from such countries are more influentially articulated in the European arena.

Here evidently the transnational institutionalisation of western Europe has also made a difference to relative position and relative influence. It is with this in mind that we should appraise the scope for politicians from an individual country to situate themselves 'at the heart of Europe'. Domestic contestation of European engagements seems to reflect the weaker array of active transnational linkages.

One manifestation of this seems to be that for the countries that are outliers in the west European process of integration, the politically peripheral, there is a striking difference between incumbent politicians and opposition politicians. Incumbents for their period in office tend to become locked into the European arena (though the British provide inconsistent evidence), while opposition politicians reveal the weaker elite interactions imposed by an EU institutional system that privileges incumbents.

But we should add a couple of codicils here. One is that political peripherality and geographical peripherality do not necessarily coincide. Ireland and Finland both seem to exemplify strong utilisation of the west European arena and a symbiosis between domestic and European opportunities, interestingly in both cases resolving territorial tensions with neighbours through a form of military neutrality. There is a longer story here in relation to Finland about the interdependence between its neutrality and the NATO alliance. A second codicil picks up the point about different qualities of voice within the west European institutions. For some west European countries there has been a closer *fit* or *congruence* than for other countries between collective west European regimes and prior national regimes or preferences. The political ability to exercise influence on, and to structure, the negotiated collective outcomes helps to reinforce attachment to the European arena. One interesting footnote here – French governments are rarely no-sayers on EU Council decisions agreed by majority votes (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace 1996). There is much scope here for nuanced cross-country comparisons.

By way of conclusion

If we then look at both western Europe and central and eastern Europe we can see two contrasting patterns. Western Europe has a legacy of multiple, but overlapping and mutually reinforcing, European arenas. Plans are under discussion in effect to try to combine the arenas and, in particular, to make the EU the predominant arena, though this is a contested process, while several countries remain outliers. Meanwhile, there is also a continuing discussion about whether and how to redefine the core role of NATO. In central and eastern Europe we can see emerging a scattering of different patterns of linkage; these are not combined and they are not clearly mutually reinforcing –

or not yet. Indeed there is some contradiction between efforts to strengthen linkages with western Europe, while also encouraging firmer links within the region.

What then of the development of linkages across the continent more broadly? Here too we can see uneven patterns, with '*dysergies*' (to coin a word) as much as *synergies*. Let me summarise across the three dimensions of function, territory and affiliation.

Function. We can see several different kinds of functional linkage emerging: those promoted by and in relation to the EU, those emerging around groups of neighbours, and those stimulated by private actors. Of these the functional linkages around the EU seem by far the most potent, with many applicants for full EU membership and the EU endeavouring to divide (differentiate is the practitioners' more ambiguous term) central and east European countries into categories of accession, association, and more distant partnership. Partnership in this context is the practitioners' euphemism. At the private level we can begin to see elements of organic linkages in the form of production and investment networks and we can observe that these are especially vigorous on the part of economic actors from particular west European countries: Germany, Austria, Finland and Italy.

Territory. The picture as regards territorial linkages is seriously confused. The decision to admit only three countries to NATO – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – leaves more questions open than it resolves about the emerging security system in Europe. Meanwhile the new territorial debate in western Europe is about the reinforcement of Schengen and the promotion within the EU of an 'area of justice, freedom and security' (to use the language from Amsterdam). This debate is, one can argue, a more or less direct consequence of the erosion of the old east-west border. It is already being played out as a constraint on the way that the central and east European countries deal with each other and on the scope for informal linkages to develop. Hence the recent difficulties between Poland and Belarus. This whole Schengen-plus discussion is perhaps the best example of how the territorial issues in pan-Europe are now being problematised. West Europeans should be very prudent here given their dismal record over the past century in establishing borders in those distant parts of central and eastern and especially south-eastern Europe which were poorly understood. Nonetheless it will be interesting to see how the groupings between neighbours develop to regu-

late contiguous borders – the policies and practices of Poland, Germany and Hungary will, for example, be especially interesting to watch.

Affiliation. It remains hard to discern the focal points of affiliation in pan-Europe and thus the scope for relevant linkages. Problems of state-building and post-communist adaptation are tough assignments for the countries in central and eastern Europe. Too much of the west European effort has been put into crude exports of fragments of a presumed west European model, much of this articulated around the statements of club membership rules by the EU. Similarly as regards the development of socio-economic patterns in the central and east European countries, west Europeans have been keen to export muddled preferences and off-the-peg arrangements. Their fit with the circumstances country-by-country is less clear. The need there too for a protected domestic space for experimentation and choice is surely important, otherwise the scope for constructive synergy between national and European arenas will be too cramped in central and eastern Europe. In the absence of synergy we might find the discourse of Europeanisation becoming an obstacle, rather than a stimulus to transnationalism, let alone a support for modernisation.

Institutions. We need to remind the practitioners of the importance of both formal and informal institution-building as instruments of integration. There is too much of the hub-and-spoke pattern in the current arrangements; too little opportunity for political and economic elites from central and eastern Europe to act as vectors of integration; too many limitations on the opportunity for central and east Europeans to speak with effective voices from which loyalties can be encouraged; and not much scope yet for the development of the rudiments of a shared social and cultural space.

I have argued in relation to west European integration that its simultaneous evolution on several different dimensions allowed scope for constructive ambiguities, for experimentation, and for differentiated dynamics. The process depended on a variety of building blocks, and changes over time allowed for creative engineering as well as organic linkages. It may be impatient and unrealistic to expect west European policy-makers to devise a comprehensive and coherent strategy in relation to central and eastern Europe. The logic of the argument in this lecture is to call for multiple arenas and opportunities for constructing linkages. What clearly does not make sense is to have the debate dominated by functional linkages, obstructed by new territorial segmentation, and weakly underpinned by shared focal points of affiliation. Stein Rokkan was extraordinarily adept at helping us to grasp these complex relationships in the history of western Europe. The best tribute we could pay him now

would be to apply some of his insights in the debate about the contemporary European continent.

Notes

1. The term 'pan-Europe' is used to connote the whole continent, irrespective of where its eastern boundary might be drawn. This reflects irritation at the way west Europeans appropriate the term 'Europe' to refer to their part of the continent, as well as at the frequent elision of Europe with the European Union.
2. Haas's account of west European integration was disturbed by his own observations about General de Gaulle (Haas 1975), just as many British observers have been much preoccupied with the impact of Mrs Thatcher.
3. Norway, Iceland and Turkey inside NATO, outside the EU; Cyprus, Malta, and Switzerland outside both; Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden inside the EU, but outside NATO.

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