COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES	
Brussels, 10.3.2001

 Draft MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMISSION
Approaches to European governance
For democratic European governance

Draft memorandum to the Commission
Approaches to European governance
Introduction
Part 1: Reactions, expectations and political context
1.1	Reactions to the announcement of the Commission White Paper on governance
1.2	The political context of European integration in 2001
1.3	The White Paper post‑Nice: making more of our institutions

Part 2: Broad thrust of the future White Paper on European governance
2.1	Understanding what Europe is all about
2.2	Transparency, participation and accountability to restore the effectiveness and credibility of the Community method
2.3	Facilitate, decentralise and integrate – three ways of expanding the circle of public players at European, national, regional and local level 
2.4	A task‑oriented Commission for a project‑based Union
2.5	Timetable and method

Conclusion
Annexes:
–	List of interdepartmental working groups
–	Organisation and method for the preparation of the White Paper

Summary
PART I:  ANALYSIS
Governance — a strategic priority
The European Commission has decided to make “better European governance” its top strategic priority. It had at least three reasons for doing so.
First, European integration has reached a new milestone in its history. The Union has successfully completed the projects for the single market and economic and monetary union; in the wake of Maastricht and Amsterdam it has become a political force in its own right; and the prospect of unification on a continental scale is now a reality. The time has come to radically re-think the entire range of policies and operating mechanisms. Second, this applies not just to the Commission. With legislative and executive functions shared, it concerns the other institutions and the Member States just as much. And third, the major projects on which the enlarged Union is to embark, at home and in the wider world, will not be possible without the full understanding and involvement of the most crucial players of all — Europe’s citizens. So there are three dimensions to governance: comprehensive radical reappraisal; inclusive government; public-private interdependence.
Purpose of The Memorandum on approaches to European governance
It was to give practical expression to this strategic priority that the Commission announced its intention to publish a White Paper by the middle of 2001. On 11 October 2000 it set up a special team, adopted a work programme and put in place a decentralised organisational structure. The watchword is freedom to explore every avenue and to consult widely outside the institution, but with the proviso that the Commission itself will consider the political implications of the resulting proposals. Preparing the ground for these interim deliberations is the primary aim of this memorandum. It will also confirm that the purpose of the future White Paper is to inform the post-Nice debate.  And it will serve as a springboard for wider consultations on the proposals it puts forward illustrating the main approaches.
The new players in Europe
The idea of better European governance has been well received by the new players in Europe. These are first and foremost the regional and local authorities, both urban and rural, who have an increasingly important role to play in enforcing Community policies and rules on the ground. There are also the socio-economic players, social partners, non-governmental organisations and third-sector associations, that together constitute organised civil society. Then there are the groups, structures and networks, some more formalised than others, that are concerned with the vast range of Community responsibilities. And lastly, there are the numerous professionals who have become experts on Europe by virtue of their profession – the journalists, scientists and national parliamentarians who have specialised in European affairs. They all look to governance for two things: greater scope to participate actively and express their opinions; and greater efficiency and responsiveness to real situations.
It is these “new players” who will benefit most from reform of European governance. But the broad public wants to have a clearer grasp of the issues that Europe is addressing. Particularly in the run‑up to replacement of the national currencies by the euro, there is an obvious desire to be able to see clearly what the major projects on the Union’s agenda actually are. Both on the international scene and at home, whenever major issues of health, safety and sustainable development arise, this goes beyond mere concern with the technical aspects. It is a matter of political significance.
Part 2:  Approaches To Democratic Governance
What we have to do once and for all is to break the vicious circle in which the Community institutions, and especially the Commission and the European Parliament, serve as the scapegoat when it comes to the wider problem facing democracy in all the Member States of the European Union. Everywhere the parliamentary representation function is being bypassed by other modes of grass-roots participation and expression.  Everywhere public decisions and policies are being co‑managed by non‑state bodies.  Everywhere uncertainty over where public responsibility lies is becoming an issue. This is generating a latent crisis of confidence that can often rightly and always easily be deflected to the remote and complex mechanisms of “Brussels”. But this search for a scapegoat comes at a high price in terms of weakened credibility for the European Union itself as it goes through the process of modernising the institutions. Restoring clarity, effectiveness and accountability to the Community machine is vital if there is to be a democratic transition to the next stages of “constitutionalisation”. We must first demonstrate that we can make more of our institutions and make them more credible and answerable to our citizens before we ask them to endorse closer legal integration. Hopefully this will also offer a way of helping the national executives and legislatures to cope with their own problems, as these new forms of European governance would apply to the administrative and political chain extending all the way from “Brussels” to the grass roots. Hence the subtitle of the White Paper on European governance – “For democratic European governance”.
Four main approaches are accordingly submitted to the Commission for approval.
–	Understanding what Europe is all about.
–	Transparency, participation and accountability to revitalise the Community method.
–	Facilitate, decentralise and integrate to expand the circle of public players at European, national, regional and local level.
–	A task‑oriented Commission for a project‑based Union.
1st Approach: UNDERSTANDING WHAT EUROPE IS ALL ABOUT
It is impossible to be actively involved in something one does not understand. A sense of belonging to Europe goes hand in hand with the ability to identify with its major projects. It is up to the Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament to ensure that the Union’s agenda is clearly presented to the public. A political agreement between the institutions would go some way towards meeting this objective as well as encouraging each of them to fulfil their own function: the Commission proposes; the Council decides along with Parliament; and Parliament debates. The three institutions could also attempt, each in their own field, to counter the compartmentalisation of European policy-making by sector and integrate the individual areas of activity more closely in the service of the major “horizontal” projects. The Commission, for instance, could organise its work around four unifying themes linking the policies the Union will need. But responsibility for a political communication strategy is for the Commission — and the Commission alone — to assume.
2nd Approach: TRANSPARENCY, RESPONSIBILITY, PARTICIPATION
It is no longer a question of playing the intergovernmental method off against the Community method. As integration has matured, so the Community method has proved itself the only viable option, since it alone guarantees the rule of law. The difficulties stem more from its becoming increasingly gridlocked. Invisible pressure from networks of experts upstream and downstream of the legislative process, consultations that fail to deliver fully or effectively, a lack of clear executive control based on objective, critical outside scrutiny — all these make for ineffectual action and distrust. The issue is how to return to the spirit of the Community method without sacrificing the wealth of the achievements to its credit over the past 20 years thanks to the wide range of skills and knowledge it has been able to mobilise.
The proposals on using scientific expertise, organising consultation and conducting impact assessment lend themselves to extension beyond the Commission to the other authorities involved in policy implementation. They will give organised civil society — businesses, the social partners, interest groups and the third sector — a stronger role and say in deciding the rules of public life. But they will not make it a substitute for political mediation. Far from it. They seek to restore political mediation to its rightful place. The proposals are aimed primarily at clarifying the executive functions. They are intended to secure genuine control by the European Parliament and to reinforce the responsibility of the Commission.
3rd Approach: FACILITATE, DECENTRALISE, INTEGRATE
Europe can no longer be built only “in Brussels”. It is not just a question of material resources. Assuming that the rise of networking does indeed radically change the way authority is exercised, it is also a cultural issue. And the fact that the classic administration under the direct charge of a Commissioner or a minister no longer really has sufficient authority or independence to regulate sensitive areas makes it a political issue too. The scheme for decision-making agencies incorporating national regulators reflects this. Pursuing the same line of thought, a return to the original spirit of “directives”, allowing much greater flexibility in their application, is vital for policies that have a strong impact on the ground. In areas such as agriculture, the environment, or regional policy, it would be possible to adopt a more nuanced approach to the implementing provisions applied at European, national and local levels. The Commission’s monopoly of the right to make proposals need not – indeed, must not – prevent it from encouraging national authorities to take part in formulating the rules for convergence. The method of open coordination, repositioned as one among the whole range of coordination or cooperation procedures flowing from the Treaty, offers a chance to build trust between national administrations. The principle could also be extended to regional and local authorities in the context of the European strategy for sustainable development.
This dimension of trust is a matter for the Commission. Besides its control function, it needs to be given a “resource centre” function, something that would be particularly appropriate with enlargement on the horizon.
4th Approach: A TASK-ORIENTED COMMISSION FOR A PROJECT-BASED UNION
All the proposals for more democratic European governance point towards the need for responsibilities to be more clearly defined both within the institutions and between them.
A decentralisation strategy designed to offer greater scope for participation by the social partners, businesses, and the third sector, or for interaction with the very broad circle of “interested parties”, means that the Commission’s core functions would have to be clearly identified and streamlined. The forthcoming White Paper on governance should include a “mission statement” for the Commission, outlining not only the main tasks assigned to it by the Treaties but also how it should go about performing them in today’s world. Taken in conjunction with the Union’s current major projects, this would make it possible to identify which of the tasks currently performed by directorates-general are truly strategic and cannot be dispensed with.
Similarly, democratic governance necessarily implies an inclusive approach aimed at involving national, regional and local public authorities in formulating and implementing policies. It would help promote a Europe increasingly unified around common projects and areas of shared sovereignty. Powers should be shared in line with principles attuned to the nature of each individual project or the policies designed to accomplish it. Those principles would have to be clearly spelled out to provide a stronger constitutional guarantee for application of the subsidiarity principle.
This is not a task for the White Paper on European governance. But it does point towards the great debate that will prepare the ground for the 2004 IGC. And in more general terms the White Paper’s conclusions will in turn point towards the changes that will eventually have to be made to the current Treaties in order to make governance more democratic: reforms to the internal structure of the institutions to increase the integration of policies by sector; a legislative framework for the agencies exercising rule-making powers under the Commission’s supervision; greater decentralisation in applying policies that have a major impact on the ground, using new “legislative” directives; tying in the Union’s major projects more closely with the fundamental rights on which it rests; strengthening the status of the Union in the multilateral institutions on which world governance depends.
CONCLUSION: THE HIDDEN TREASURE
The Community method is the hidden treasure of the European Union. We owe to it not only the extraordinary acquis of a Union governed by the rule of law but also the very fact of its attraction for its neighbours. The main threat it faces does not come from the intergovernmental method. The real dangers are of suffocation and, with that, the temptation to begin dismantling around the edges. Both these threats stem from the same source: the relentless growth in the number of executive tasks linked to major political issues. If one had to single out two crucial points in this report, they would be:
-	the care to be taken in delineating the European Parliament’s powers to monitor executive activity (Approach No 2);
-	the balance to be struck in defining the tasks assigned to Community agencies with decision-making powers (Approach No 3).

INTRODUCTION
In February 2000 the Commission decided that promoting new forms of European governance was to be the first strategic objective of its term of office, the aim being to bring Europe closer to its citizens and make our institutions more open and more democratic. On 11 October, when it approved the work programme for drawing up the White Paper on European governance, it spelled out the rationale behind this initiative.
–	As it enters the new century, the European Union still faces huge challenges despite all the achievements of the past forty years. If it is not to be found lacking, it will have to capitalise on all that is strong and effective in the Community method. But that method needs to be modernised if it is to win back public confidence. Re‑thinking the forms of governance, in other words the art of governing in association with the parties concerned, has become a sine qua non for further constitutional advances. The challenge of enlargement is a good example: its success will depend not just on carrying through the necessary institutional changes but also on putting in place forms of collective action that are more inclusive and more effective as of now.
–	The strategic priority assigned to governance signals the joint responsibility of the European institutions, including the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, for improving the way they work together to govern and legislate. In parallel with the in‑house administrative reform that has now been vigorously set in motion, the future White Paper on European governance should open up avenues for modernisation, for discussion with the other institutions and national players alike. By clarifying the way in which legislative and executive responsibilities are exercised at present, it will raise the curtain for the post‑Nice debate on future powers.
The Commission rounded off its discussion of 11 October by adopting ground rules for the preparatory work on the White Paper by the governance team and the twelve interdepartmental working groups set up for the purpose: the watchwords are creativity, freedom to explore areas of interest, open‑mindedness and consultation, but also accountability to the Commission. A work schedule was then drawn up, including the drafting of a “report on the options illustrating various possible solutions to the problems set and various guidelines for the policies that the Union needs”, to be presented to the Commission for discussion. This memorandum incorporates the report.
The Commission is requested:
•	to take note of the reactions to the announcement of the White Paper and the analysis of the political context outlined in Part 1;
•	to approve the four main approaches set out in Part 2;
•	to authorise further work on the proposals illustrating each of these approaches, involving the interdepartmental working groups holding wider consultations lasting until May;
•	to adopt a framework for the presentation and discussion of the future White Paper on European governance.

Part 1: REACTIONS, EXPECTATIONS AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
1.1	Reactions to the announcement of the Commission White Paper on governance
•	The first point to stress is the strong reaction from local and regional players to the announcement of a Commission initiative on governance. This confirms the role now played by “sub‑national” public authorities in the implementation of Community policies – a role that is perhaps underrated. It also reflects the dynamism of local grass‑roots democracy. The expectations are centred on two very different perceptions, also to be found in the broad positions expressed during the debate on political objectives held in 2000:
–	for the regions invested with legislative powers, above all the Länder, governance offers first and foremost an opportunity to raise the institutional issue of stricter subject‑related demarcation of powers between the Union and its Member States;
–	for the other regional and local authorities, the debate is not so much about institutional changes as about building a multi‑tier Europe underpinned by better network‑based consultation and cooperation practices.
That said, the local players still feel the need for genuine “regulation” of the subsidiarity principle, claiming that, as things stand at present, there is a discrepancy between practice and principle. Some complain that the Union’s powers have extended too far, others that its legislation is too detailed.
•	Reactions from national governments have remained low‑key, with two exceptions: the United Kingdom, where the governance project is widely welcomed as the driving‑force behind user‑oriented reform of the public sector; and Germany, where it is considered essential that the governance debate should not evade the institutional question of how powers are allocated.
•	Announcement of the White Paper has raised substantial expectations on the part of civil society, and the two sides of industry in particular. NGOs were already alerted to the Commission’s desire for greater openness by its White Paper on internal reform. As they see it, governance should lead to rules – legally binding if possible – that secure their involvement in the decision‑making processes. “What we want is to know the Commission’s agenda and to be able to have our say, without depending on the discretion of officials”, an influential member of the European forum for sustainable development said recently.

1: What is meant by “civil society”?
The notion of civil society emerged from the attempts by political philosophers to devise a conceptual basis first for the State and then for democracy. It is used to refer either to the ability of citizens to participate directly in public life, or to the organisations outside the domain of the State which provide the structure for such participation. The revitalisation of civil society is a trend that has emerged worldwide over the last two decades alongside political and economic liberalisation. This report adopts the definition of “organised civil society” advanced by the Economic and Social Committee: “the social partners and the third sector, including NGOs”. But the term “civil society” in general covers a wider and more diffuse phenomenon, encompassing both structured organisations and informal groupings of citizens. This report also refers to such informal groups as “interested parties”; unless otherwise specified the term “civil society” will include both “organised civil society” and “interested parties”.

As regards the social partners, both the Economic and Social Committee and Unice are not only anxious to safeguard their specific status in the social dialogue; they also want to see the many different information and consultation procedures set up by the various directorates‑general clarified. Within the Economic and Social Committee, which aspires to become the forum for organised civil society, the issue of European governance has triggered an in‑depth discussion, as illustrated by a recent opinion on simplifying rules in the single market and summarised as follows by its rapporteur: “It is impossible for good European governance to exist without the genuine involvement of the social partners and the third sector; but such involvement in turn creates a genuine responsibility for civil society.”
But what civil society expects from European governance is not merely greater openness or participation. The business community in particular, but associations representing users and consumers as well, want a European Union that is more effective, quicker to respond, and more reliable, both when it comes to the enforcement of rules and in terms of access to programmes. For their part, specialists in corporate governance see the White Paper as a signal that there will be a fresh effort to clarify responsibilities within the European political system.
•	Mention should also be made of the many reactions from specialist academics and researchers in European governance, a discipline that has come into its own in the last decade, reflecting the success of the single market. The general feeling is that the confrontation between the “federal model” and the “intergovernmental model” needs to be tempered by the innovative developments of a European integration model; its democratic deficit remains a major problem, but cannot be solved by merely transposing the national model.

1.2	The political context of European integration in 2001
•	The conclusions of the Nice European Council have to some extent crystallised the thinking that has emerged from the wide‑ranging debate launched in 2000 on the Union’s political objectives. Not only is another IGC planned for 2004, with the aim of strengthening the constitutional nature of the Treaty, but the IGC itself is to be preceded by a large and wide‑ranging debate. Both the topics envisaged for the new IGC and the organisation of the debate highlight the role of the national parliaments.
•	But the fate of these future institutional changes remains in the hands of Europe’s citizens, who may or may not agree to the changes being ratified. The latest opinion polls confirm the high level of public expectation: citizens want the European Union to be more assertive, more powerful on the international stage; they would like it to take the lead in what they see as the increasingly integrated areas of the environment, health and consumer protection; and they are also in favour of it taking on an enhanced security role to counter the elimination of internal borders.
These expectations are reflected in the desire of the majority, at least on the continent, for genuine political integration, particularly in the fields of defence and taxation, and for the election of an EU president. In the minds of most citizens, such developments go hand in hand with the political dimension they associate with the imminent replacement of national currencies by the euro.
But these same opinion polls confirm that confidence in the European institutions, which has waned since adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, has still not recovered. A qualitative survey has been conducted as part of the preparatory work on the White Paper on governance in the fifteen Member States and in nine applicant countries, supplementing the quantitative surveys. It throws light on this paradoxical mix of expectation and distrust. Citizens fail to understand what European integration is all about. It is as if they cannot see how to fit together the pieces of the jigsaw of European affairs fed to them in such fragmentary form. It stems too from a lack of familiarity with the decision‑making process, often compounded by the unwillingness of national authorities to shoulder their share of responsibility. Bringing Europe closer to the people does not mean getting involved in local politicking or slavishly going along with day‑to‑day fluctuations in public opinion. It is more a question of making Europe’s major objectives more visible, its workings more understandable and, as a result, its machinery more accountable.
•	It is not just confidence in the European institutions that needs to be rebuilt: European integration may hold centre stage, but equally searching questions are being asked about the way in which national democracies are operating. First the national parliaments are becoming aware of the need to refocus the way in which they exercise their legislative responsibilities and their control function, given the proliferation of new forms of cooperation between public and private players. And national executives too are seeing the real impact of their actions dwindle though they still bear full political responsibility. Against the background of this debate, improving the forms of European governance must be a positive‑sum game. The different levels of public authority in Europe must be strengthened in the process. The parliamentary representation function – European and national – will remain the guarantee of public accountability. Hence the subtitle of this report: for democratic European governance.

1.3	The White Paper post-Nice: making more of our institutions 
•	The following conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis.
–	With the imminent changeover to the euro and with enlargement approaching fast, there is an urgent need to respond to the expectations of the general public. Better governance here means making the Union’s objectives more readily apparent to people and giving them a clearer sense of what it is really about.
–	The current modus operandi of the European institutions does not really allow for the involvement of new players, whose very vitality and dynamism are partly the product of European integration itself: regional and local authorities, whose powers of initiative transcend frontiers; civil society committed to the implementation of fundamental rights in general and equal opportunities in particular; groups of researchers and academics inspired by free movement and programmes of cooperation; national administrations spontaneously organising exchange networks; and European affairs committees within national parliaments, increasingly expert and consulted more and more frequently on Community matters. They could all potentially breathe new democratic life into the European political system.
–	Effectiveness must not be allowed to fall victim to the need for increased involvement. The challenge of governance is precisely to reconcile these two potentially conflicting needs. Enriching the decision‑making process by drawing on the experience of those directly concerned and adjusting the rules in the light of reactions on the ground should in theory boost the effectiveness of European legislation. Care will have to be taken, though, not to lose what is gained through broader consultation by making the process more time‑consuming. What we must avoid most of all is watering down responsibilities as a result of loose association, consultation and partnership procedures. Rigour was precisely one of the main strengths of the Community method: the Commission proposes, the Council decides, and the national administrations implement. It is the clarity of the Community method that has to be rehabilitated.
•	Consequently, in the context of the post‑Nice process leading to a new IGC with a constitutional focus, it will be necessary first of all to show how the Community institutions and the national administrations could make more of the existing Treaty framework. Proposals for democratic governance will therefore be formulated first on the basis of an unchanged Treaty. They will tackle reforms encompassing the full chain of responsibility from the Union institutions to implementation on the ground. Reforms will be described as procedural where they affect the channels of communication or transmission of knowledge; they will be termed structural where they concern the allocation of responsibilities between the institutions or administrations.
•	Hence the approaches which will be proposed by the future White Paper:
–	Understanding what Europe is all about. It is impossible to participate in something one does not understand. This approach encompasses the communication strategy and cooperation between the institutions in order to put objectives across more effectively.
–	Transparency, participation and accountability to rehabilitate the Community method. Here we will describe the procedural reforms needed to boost public confidence and make decision‑making more effective.
–	Facilitate, integrate and decentralise to expand the circle of European public players. This will focus more on structural reforms, giving greater recognition to the role played by the national administrations and by regional and local authorities.
–	A task‑oriented Commission for a project‑based Union. We will point out the logical consequences of an inclusive modernising approach in terms of the Commission’s tasks and the implementation of subsidiarity.
These four approaches are illustrated by proposals largely reflecting current thinking within the working groups. Some of them concern only the Commission, but most of them will have to be discussed or negotiated with the other Union institutions and bodies. They will have to be spelled out in greater technical detail and tabled for wider consultation than has hitherto been possible. As they stand, however, they reflect a range of choices.

part 2: BROAD THRUST OF THE FUTURE WHITE PAPER
ON EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE
2.1	Understanding what Europe is all about
The public and the media have problems when it comes to understanding the European Union. The feeling that it is constantly interfering in everyday matters perceived as belonging to the local domain is compounded by the impression that it is conspicuous by its absence when essential issues are at stake. Europe would undoubtedly be more readily accepted in day‑to‑day affairs if it were easier to see its connection with the key objectives of the Union and with the things people care most about: quality of life, security and prosperity in Europe, stability and justice in the world. The Union is paying the price of its compartmentalisation by subject area. The proposals relate first to the message, what the European Union is all about, its “rallying call” (proposals 1 and 2). They then look at ways of organising in‑house work and cooperation between the European institutions that would enhance the Union’s profile (proposals 3 and 4). And lastly they explore the issue of political communication, an area where the Commission has specific assets (proposals 5 and 6).
Proposal 1: Identify three or four flagship projects for the European Union capable of mobilising public support
The four strategic priorities set by the European Commission in January 2000, the commitment to technological, economic and social excellence expressed by the Lisbon European Council and the quest for progress in security and defence within the European Union already convey some idea of the Union’s current ambitions. But they form a disparate mix of objectives to which it is hard to be committed.
The future White Paper on European governance should therefore identify three or four flagship projects expressing the Union’s current political ambitions and capable of mobilising public support. They should be articulated in the spirit of Article 2 of the Treaty, reflecting the desires expressed by the public in various opinion polls and the main policy objectives announced by the three institutions in the year 2000. In the box below we give an idea of what these projects might be and a possible wording, as a starting point for discussion.

2: Four flagship projects for the EU for the 21st century

•	Making the continent of Europe a safe and peaceful place to live by fostering mutual respect and trust.
•	Making Europe the leading centre of excellence for the knowledge‑based economy by capitalising on the quality of its human resources and its social cohesion.
•	Bequeathing to the next generation a better quality of life by developing Europe’s natural resources and safeguarding its regional diversity.
•	Making Europe a world power and a model for dealing with the challenge of globalisation, working for diversity, multiculturalism, and respect for human rights.

Proposal 2: Commit to better world governance
Not only Europe’s external partners but ordinary Europeans themselves are afraid that there could come a time when the European Union is so taken up with enlargement that it neglects its responsibilities to the rest of the world. Yet commitment to European integration, particularly for the younger generations, is inextricably linked to the need to face up to globalisation and all that it entails. International action by the Union at Community level alone is already considerable. Analysis of the Commission’s use of its right of initiative shows that, leaving aside straightforward adjustments to legislation (35%), activity geared to the rest of the world currently accounts for nearly as many legal instruments (31%) as internal activity (34%). This little‑known face of the European Union should be presented as a major dimension of its added value.
The flagship projects advocated in the future White Paper should include the setting of an ambitious target for EU action to work towards better world governance. The analysis of group 5 clearly shows how, for this to be achieved, there must first be better European governance. It indicates, for example, how the external impact of internal policies will have to be integrated and coordinated. It also gives clear shape to the world governance reform process by identifying two stages: making multilateral institutions more coherent (procedural reform) and, in the longer term, moving beyond the status quo (structural reform). 
Proposal 3: The Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament to agree a clear multiannual agenda.
It is widely accepted that the European Council agendas in the past four or five years have been much too long. The result is an institutional triangle that is weakened, a subsidiarity principle that is undermined, and a Europe that is difficult to understand. The key to the problem lies in reforming the way the Council works, but the Commission can help by being selective and by working with the Council’s General Secretariat to anticipate the defining moments in the life of the European Union.
Similarly, the Commission can help enhance the quality of debates in the European Parliament by presenting the House with policy alternatives, rather than just the consensus view, for discussion at the key occasions in the parliamentary year. That said, it is clearly up to Parliament to organise itself in such a way as to become a leading forum for European public debate.
At the beginning of each parliamentary session the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission should agree the broad timing and the key items of the Community agenda on the basis of the debate following the presentation of the Commission’s programme.
Proposal 4: Integrate the Union’s sectoral policies by main objectives at an earlier stage of the process
In the medium term, bringing the European Union closer to the people will entail greater integration of European measures and initiatives at an earlier stage of the process so as to counter the vertical compartmentalisation by sector that is typical of the internal structures of our institutions. Here, too, reform of the Council of Ministers is a necessary prerequisite, but the Commission can prepare for this process and help promote similar changes in the other institutions (the Council and Parliament). The preparation of the synthesis report and the framing of a European strategy for sustainable development show the way.
Permanent cross‑sectoral teams should be established within the Commission, drawn from the different directorates-general working on the same objective. The process of interdepartmental consultations on major issues would be modified accordingly. The work of group 6 (“the policies that will be needed by an enlarged Union”) anticipates this type of cross-sectoral integration, by organising forward-looking policy analysis around four themes which could provide a link between the different common policies: human resources; competitiveness and social cohesion; regional diversity and quality of life; neighbourhood policy. The aim is to ensure consistency between policies before implementation and to define a method for discussing them with Member States and applicant countries, possibly by proposing a permanent framework for discussions by broad theme between directorates-general to inform the work of  the groups of Commission Members.
Proposal 5: Endow the Commission with a proper communication strategy
Putting across these flagship projects and defending them to the general public in the Member States and applicant countries will mean that the Union will have to assume a political communication function that cannot be performed entirely by the Council of Ministers. This is a requirement for the long-term, not just for times of crisis, when the political control of communication is vital. If the qualitative opinion surveys are to be believed, the Commission is in a much better position than is generally thought for taking on this communication function.
The Commission should develop a communication strategy; group 1a is working on a range of proposals with differing degrees of ambition, depending on whether just the Commissioners themselves, the spokesman’s group, or all the directorates-general participate.
Proposal 6: Invest in the quality of the European debate
Again in the medium term, the key to discovering what the European Union is all about lies in a decentralised debate on European issues between members of the public: we can only identify with things that we can discuss. It is not enough just to disseminate information about what the European Union is doing and how it can be “used”; a premium must also be placed on debate orchestrated by the different players in Europe.
Based on the work of groups 1a (“building the European public space”) and 1b (“democratising expertise”), a programme of action should be formulated to enhance the quality of the European debate: partnership with schools of journalism; forging links between Internet networks of ordinary citizens and networks of experts connected with Community information activities to create “virtual forums” (group 1a); new forms of dialogue between the public and the scientific experts serving on European advisory committees; principles to ensure accessibility and pluralism in the way the Commission uses expert advice (group 1b).

2.2	Transparency, participation and accountability to restore the effectiveness and credibility of the Community method
The Community method introduced almost fifty years ago is here to stay; there is no viable alternative. We realise this when we have to draw up reliable and democratic rules for freedom of movement. We sense its relevance as enlargement approaches and, with a wider diversity of nations, we have to keep the common interest in our sights. The long‑standing antagonism between the Community method and the intergovernmental method is less worrying than the erosion of the Community method. In practice, the Commission’s exclusive right of initiative is exposed to growing invisible pressures from outside; the Council of Ministers and Parliament have difficulty reaching decisions, and texts are complex as a result; Parliament is prevented from exercising its powers of scrutiny as it should. The whole structure is often perceived by ordinary people as too intricate or ineffectual. The proposals outlined here follow the decision‑making chain from the Community institutions down to grassroots level. The basic thinking behind them all is the same: transparency in relations with civil society and the involvement of socio‑professional players or citizens’ groupings must be designed and developed to enable the EU institutions and the national authorities to discharge their respective responsibilities more effectively. 

3: The Community method
The Community method is so called because of the characteristic way that powers in the successive “European Communities” have been divided and have operated from the outset. It involves a clear division between the power to make proposals – the sole prerogative of the Commission – and the power to legislate – which rests with the Council of the Union and the European Parliament. In addition the Council can delegate implementing powers to the Commission. In other words the task assigned to the Commission is to implement rules laid down by the legislator. Monitoring the application of the rules, whether laid down by legislation or executive action, rests with the Commission and the Court of Justice, the judicial arm of the Community system.
The balance between the institutions is the essence of the Community method. Its originality compared with the balance of powers within a State is inextricably bound up with the unique nature of European integration: the construction of an entity governed by the rule of law, producing legislation that takes precedence over national law but still respects the individuality of the member nations.	

Proposal 7: Establish a European framework for developing and using expert assistance 
In the course of policy preparation the Commission and the Member States draw on a huge volume of scientific expertise and knowledge. There is probably no other forum in the world to match the European Union as a hotbed for intercultural exchange of knowledge. How can this potential be harnessed to the full? This has to be a task primarily for the European research area. At present, knowledge is too often exchanged by subject area and processed through national channels up to European level. There is therefore a risk of producing predetermined legislative or executive solutions with no reference to political responsibilities. The procedures for issuing scientific or expert opinions should be subject to criteria of pluralism and exposure to criticism. This could be a way of enhancing the authority of expert advice, restoring the relative independence of the relationship between the Commission and its “advisers”, and ensuring accountability to Parliament and the Council.
A European framework should be established for the development and use of expert assistance. On the basis of the work of group 1b, a range of possibilities with differing degrees of ambition are being explored: the preparation of guidelines for the use of expert assistance by the Commission inspired by best practice in the Member States; the organisation of an interface between experts, the executive, and panels of ordinary members of the public, for example with the aid of popular science magazines in Europe; the creation of networks of experts linking national centres of excellence, subject to conditions regarding pluralism and quality. The ease of access to information and the scope for feedback offered by new communication technologies is also being looked at.
Proposal 8: Make the consultation of organised civil society and local players more effective
The European Communities have a long tradition of consulting organised civil society (the social partners, representatives of the third sector), formalised at the outset by the creation of the Economic and Social Committee. The subsequent establishment of the Committee of the Regions acknowledged the political representation function of local and regional authorities. At the same time, the social dialogue gives the social partners a role in initiating employment legislation which goes well beyond straightforward consultation. Finally, as a result of the Union’s new powers the Commission has substantially boosted the number of ad hoc consultative bodies and in so doing has taken account of the dynamism of the third sector; this is particularly true for environmental affairs and development.
This whole structure, in the view of those directly involved, needs to be overhauled. Valuable consultations, i.e. those which occur at an early stage of the decision-making process, are as a rule very specialised. Horizontal bodies like the ESC and CoR are rarely able to deliver expedient opinions. The third sector, indispensable and fragile at one and the same time, has an often ambiguous relationship with the Commission, providing advice but from a position of dependency.
Group 2a recommends a gradualist approach. Building on the work of the Secretariat‑General with NGOs over the past two years and against the background of the more recent administrative reform, it seeks first to establish minimum standards of quality and transparency in relations between the Commission and organised civil society. This pragmatic approach could in time take the form of a set of voluntary and mutual commitments; such practices would be drawn up and implemented in agreement with the other European institutions and also with national, regional and local authorities whenever Community policies were being implemented.
The proposal also aims at upgrading the consultative role of the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. One idea put forward would be to make these two bodies responsible for organising early consultations or issuing exploratory opinions on certain major issues, with the help of their respective networks. The opinions presented to the Commission on this basis would be widely disseminated, as would the response to them. It would be for the European Parliament to monitor the quality of the overall consultation process.
Proposal 9: Launch a new phase of “the new approach”
The Treaties are compatible with a wide range of options for the participation of organised civil society. The social dialogue is one, as is “the new approach” adopted for the internal market directives, which allowed firms a considerable degree of flexibility in complying with the rules. 

4: What is meant by “the new approach”?
The Council resolution of 7 May 1985 introduced a new approach for the adoption and implementation of Community legislation on technical harmonisation and standards. It is based on two main principles.
	Harmonised legislation is adopted only to lay down essential requirements ensuring a high standard of protection in terms of safety, health, consumer protection and protection of the environment for products to benefit from freedom of movement; appropriate certification procedures are devised according to the risks involved; the CE mark affixed by the manufacturer shows that the product conforms to the relevant legislation.
	Technical specifications for products meeting the essential requirements are laid down by harmonised standards drafted by the European standards organisations; application of the harmonised standards is voluntary, but confers a presumption of conformity with the corresponding essential requirements; the manufacturer can always apply other technical specifications in order to comply with the essential requirements.

Nowadays, however, the involvement of socio‑economic players in regulating market access is taking on a new significance. In the new information and communication technologies, and soon too in biotechnology, it will be impossible to by‑pass the expertise of leading‑edge companies.
Such “co-regulation” poses major challenges. For the public authorities it will mean not only laying down a flexible framework for implementing pre-established legislation but also considering the possibility of approving and extending rules established under voluntary agreements or codes of conduct. Bottom-up measures, as opposed to exclusively top-down measures, will broaden the scope of the new approach. Intensification of the social dialogue, in the form of European collective agreements negotiated by the social partners, reflects the same philosophy.
This extension of the new approach would give socio‑economic players, businesses, consumer associations and the social partners direct responsibility for framing rules. But it also carries risks which need to be clarified. The extension by the Commission of codes of conduct and other rules established by voluntary agreement for the private sector raises a number of problems of substance, including the responsibility of the parties drafting the rules, the criteria for approval, and the need to strike a balance between conflicting private interests. 
A new phase of the new approach should be launched, giving greater responsibility to the socio‑economic players for framing the rules by which they are governed. Drawing on analysis already carried out by a number of Commission departments and on practice in the Member States, group 2c is pursuing this option with a view to clarifying the conditions, potential fields of application and criteria for taking this approach further. This proposal implies constant and consistent monitoring of the regulatory cycle, incorporating all the elements from formulation, through implementing provisions, to updating. It will result in proposals for networking, internal to the Commission and open to the Member States.
Proposal 10: Promote the use of impact assessment and evaluation to clarify the responsibilities of the Commission, the Council and Parliament

5: The Community legal system
•	Primary Community legislation comprises all the Treaty provisions. The European University Institute has produced a proposal to restructure the Treaties making a clear distinction between the basic provisions and the rest.
•	Secondary Community legislation comprises:
–	all the legal instruments based on the Treaties adopted by the Council of Ministers and, in the case of the codecision procedure, by Parliament as well (approximately 400 instruments per year: roughly 20 directives, 180 regulations and 200 decisions);
–	all the legal instruments adopted by the Commission by virtue of the executive powers conferred on it by the Council; there are three types of committee (advisory, management and regulatory) to help the Commission with this task (the “committee procedure”); some of these instruments are of a general legislative nature (around 1 200 a year), others relate to individual decisions (usually of limited duration), mostly concerning the day‑to‑day management of Community policies (more than 2 000 a year);
–	the instruments adopted by the Commission by virtue of the powers conferred on it by the Treaty in matters of competition.

Under the Community method the Commission has the exclusive right to initiate legislation and exercises extensive executive power (see box above). However, only 10% of the Commission’s legislative proposals are made on its own initiative, as against 20% in response to requests by the Council or Parliament. The vast bulk of legislative activity now occurs at executive level: every year the Commission adopts some 1 200 rule-making decisions and more than twice that number of “management” or individual decisions. The committee system set up to allow the Member States to exercise control over those decisions does not make for clear lines of responsibility or for clear texts. Moreover, it upsets the balance of codecision in that, in practice, it deprives the European Parliament of the power of control.
Wider use of impartial methods for ex ante evaluation (of spending programmes) or impact analysis (of rules) would enable the Commission to resist outside pressures more easily: it would be in a stronger position to justify its choice of the instrument best suited to the objectives pursued, including the option of using no legal instrument at all.
Using those same tools for ex post evaluation or impact analysis could also be helpful for the purposes of simplifying or continually adapting legislation, especially implementing provisions adopted under the committee procedure. Disseminating the results of such impact or evaluation studies would probably be a positive step in two respects.
–	It would serve to justify, in the eyes of the Council or the Member States, delegating all executive responsibility to the Commission, thereby leading to the use of advisory committees only. It has to be borne in mind that some committees already open to the applicant countries now have almost 60 members.
–	It would enable the European Parliament to perform its function as watchdog over the executive more effectively, and to be alerted and able to respond if the parties concerned were to react. In short, impact or evaluation studies would constitute an ideal form of supporting evidence in line with the requirements of transparency.
On the basis of the work of group 2b, impact assessment and programme evaluation tools should be applied across the board, in the same way that feedback is currently used in several fields including the internal market. Points under consideration include the transparency of these tools; extending the criteria for use to take account of businesses and other players in society; the involvement of national administrations in implementation and follow-up; and their use as part of the committee procedure, with a view to clarifying the responsibilities of the Commission, the Council, the Member States and the European Parliament.
2.3	 Facilitate, decentralise and integrate – three ways of expanding the circle of public players at European, national, regional and local level
The proposals looked at so far have focused on Community policies and rules as they directly affect the citizen, the aim being to respond to the new potential of civil society for self‑expression and participation and, in so doing, to restore clarity to the Community method.
The focus now is on the public players involved in applying the Community method, particularly downstream of the legislative process. The common thread running all the way through the proposals in this section is obvious. On the one hand, the authorities acting or taking decisions “in Brussels” (the European Commission and national government representatives) are having to cope with an ever‑growing volume of executive, legislative and decision‑making tasks. At the same time, if they are to implement these executive rules effectively, they face conflicting requirements: they have to apply them more rigorously and uniformly; yet they also have to be able to adapt to the diversity of local conditions. The question of “decentralisation” thus raises distinctly contrasting issues in different areas. In general, though, especially with enlargement now approaching fast, solutions are needed that will establish a climate of trust and shared responsibility, a more “inclusive” relationship between the Commission and national, regional, and local government authorities, and equally between those authorities themselves.
The proposals set out below therefore come under the heading of “structural reform”. While they do not require any change to primary legislation, they redefine the relative positions of public players at European, national, regional and local level. The proposed modernisation covers both involvement in policy‑making (proposals 11 and 12) and the application of Community rules (proposals 13, 14 and 15). These proposals will each be implemented against the backdrop of the silent revolution in networking. Group 4b’s work on codification will provide the methodological tools for the job.

Proposal 11: Facilitate open coordination with a view to integration
The open coordination method was given a boost by the Lisbon European Council, inspired by the success of the Luxembourg process in achieving convergence between national employment policies, which itself was inspired by the method put in place for implementing the three stages leading to economic and monetary union. However, many observers are afraid that open coordination may become a substitute for the Community method or even for enhanced cooperation, posing a risk that democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament and its national counterparts may be evaded.
What is new in open coordination is not the principle as such, but the mutual learning process that is set in motion, requiring the Commission to act as a facilitator, to set targets and to ensure that procedures are followed. This builds trust between national administrations on difficult issues and gets Member States working towards effective cooperation.
It is therefore proposed that we go resolutely down the road of open coordination, keeping the European Parliament fully informed and drawing inspiration from the approach adopted for education. Group 4a (“giving expert opinions on the convergence process for national policies”) is working out where open coordination stands in relation to the whole range of possibilities for cooperation and coordination offered by the Treaties. It will define the criteria for ensuring that the chosen mode of coordination is proportionate to the Community objectives being pursued. And it will come up with suggestions for building bridges between open coordination and the Community method, in particular enhanced cooperation.
Proposal 12: Build a Europe of regional and local areas as part of a strategy for sustainable development
The growing devolution of power from national governments to the regions, the movement in all Union countries towards forms of democracy based on closeness to the people, and the proven ability of regions and cities to launch cross‑border initiatives – all these are factors in what is one of the major political changes to have taken place in the European Union over the last ten years. This change is more than just the sum of parallel national trends. It has a unique European dimension reminiscent of the era of the Hague Congress and the inception of the Council of Europe, when regional and local authorities were already finding their own voice. Networking is playing a positive part in a revival of the Europe of cities and regions. 
These developments suggest that we should extend the concept of open coordination to regional and local players, but without undermining national constitutional arrangements. The first instance of its application could be in implementing a European strategy for sustainable development, on which the Commission has to present a report to the Gothenburg European Council. The approach we should follow is to be found in the Community Spatial Development Perspective adopted by the Commission and the Member States in 1999, though that initial experiment lacked proper preparation and genuine consultation.
The philosophy behind the “Local Agenda 21” projects is for sustainable development in the European Union to be the product not only of central decisions and rules, but also of coherent local strategies instigated by all the relevant regions and localities that make up the Union.
Group 4c is therefore proposing that at an early stage, i.e. several years before the launch of a new phase in the Union’s multiannual policy programming (“Agenda 2007”), a debate be initiated on development objectives and priorities at the various geographical levels. The aim would be to organise cross‑border or trans‑national cooperation on an intermediate scale in appropriate regions – sometimes referred to as “mini‑Europes”. These might include regions such as the Baltic, the North Sea, the Alps, the Atlantic arc, the Danube basin, the Ionian and Adriatic Islands, and the Rhine valley. One advantage of such intermediate frameworks is that they bring together countries from the north, south, east and west of the continent. How attractive this proposal is for national and local authorities will depend on the extent to which the revamped common agricultural policy, the trans‑European networks, and the economic and social cohesion policy can be tied in.
Proposal 13: More delegation of rule enforcement to national, regional and local authorities
When the European Economic Community was first set up and new common policies were launched, there was undoubtedly a need to lay down a clear and uniform basis for the implementation of rules and policies. But today, with the strong trend towards decentralisation in most Member States, we can and must consider the possibility of a more nuanced approach in applying policies in different countries, regions and localities. This is particularly relevant in the case of policies that have a major impact on the ground, provided the level playing field of the internal market is not put at risk.
Guidelines should be laid down for a more nuanced approach in applying Community policies – one that is more closely tailored to the situation on the ground. Group 3b has set about this task, using concrete examples drawn from agricultural, environmental and regional policy. In particular, it is examining how the Commission, Member States and local authorities could conclude contracts based on the attainment of given objectives and involving flexibility in terms of the financial resources and regulation involved. Special attention will be paid to financial controls – a vital factor, but one which stands in the way of devolving greater responsibility to local players – and the scope for providing regional and local authorities with more training in Community policies. The group is also examining how – in addition to the regional bodies recognised by the Treaty – urban communities could also be more closely involved in certain Community policies such as transport or the environment. 
But more generally, in order to take proper account of local and regional differences without calling into question the distinctive features of national constitutions, it is proposed that we return to the original concept of Community directives, where the broad principles are determined by codecision, and the task of adopting detailed implementing measures is left to the Commission, the Member States and possibly the regions or other public bodies. 
Proposal 14: Convert the Commission into a resource centre and restore the function of “monitoring the monitor”
A more nuanced approach to the application of Community policies is unthinkable in the current climate of mutual distrust between national administrations. And there is a real danger that this distrust will harden with enlargement, even though the applicant countries are making an effort – and in some cases a considerable effort – to absorb the acquis communautaire.
Hence the need to look first at the question of how the Commission monitors the application of Community law. Research by the governance team, working with the group of coordinators in the DGs responsible for the application of Community law, shows that not enough resources are available to monitor regulations and directives effectively, and in some areas (fisheries for example) on‑the‑spot inspections are virtually out of the question. The problem is not simply technical or budgetary (shortage of resources, a control function hijacked by the processing of complaints). It is primarily political, as in practice the division of responsibilities between the Union and the Member States gives the latter the lion’s share of responsibility for controls and sanctions.
But closer scrutiny of national controls by the Commission, OLAF and the Court of Auditors is pointless if the national administrations themselves are lacking resources or experience. Another approach – alongside controls – would be to use networking techniques to develop exchanges of experience between national administrations.
The directorates‑general responsible for running the main Community policies should be given not only a monitoring function but also a function as a “resource centre” (providing information, assistance and cooperation) to ensure the smooth application of those policies. The monitoring function would need to be spelled out in more detail in the study being carried out by the governance team and the coordinators on the application of Community law. As for the “resource” function, we should draw on the methods used by the Enlargement DG. The partnership schemes used to assess the status of the acquis communautaire in the applicant countries and to foster the transfer of experience between national administrations should be extended to the Member States of the Union. 
Proposal 15: Establish the framework for European decision‑making agencies
Areas where there is decisive on‑the‑ground impact lend themselves to “vertical” decentralisation. In others, strict enforcement of the rules is vital. This is the case with health and safety standards. The decision‑making powers in these areas are of extreme political sensitivity, and reliability and consistency of application at European level will become increasingly vital to keep pace with progress in integration and new technology. The Commission’s executive responsibility covers decision‑making tasks of this kind (for example, issuing marketing authorisations for prototypes) and ensuring they are properly performed. The demands made on it are bound to increase.
But the extreme cases, where the environmental and health stakes are obvious, are not the only ones which require reliable enforcement of complex regulations. In other areas, such as the regulation of transport, telecommunications and energy networks, monitoring universal service provision will soon be a key political issue. And the Commission’s potential executive responsibilities outstrip the resources at its disposal.
In theory, it should be possible to overcome such problems by recruiting enough high‑calibre specialists to the Commission. But quite apart from the foreseeable material difficulties, a better option might be to create Community agencies – with a view to a wider spread of European responsibilities and greater involvement of national players, particularly with enlargement in mind. With clear procedural rules governing their activities, they would enhance the credibility of European legislation.  Ultimately such agencies, with the power to make “recommendations” to the Commission, would enable the latter to concentrate fully on exercising its legislative function. The net result would be to refocus the Commission’s political responsibility. It would have the task not only of monitoring the agencies but also more generally of ensuring consistency between their fields of activity.
A framework should therefore be established for “European decision‑making agencies”. The proposal being drawn up by group 3a (“preparing the ground for decentralisation through agencies”) provides for a new function – “regulating the national regulators” – to be exercised by European decision‑making agencies with executive implementing powers (individual decisions, codification of practices). In particular, the proposal will spell out which fields would be involved, what kind of legal basis would be used – ad hoc (a case‑by‑case approach) or generic (based on general instructions) – how the structures would be defined, what the terms of reference would be, and what arrangements would be made for monitoring by the Commission and/or the European Parliament. The aim will be to strike a balance between careful scrutiny and real independence, on which the agencies’ authority would depend.
However, there are no plans in the proposal to give agencies legislative powers requiring amendments to the Treaties.
2.4	A task‑oriented Commission for a project‑based Union 
So it is possible to modernise and democratise the practices of our institutions without changing the existing Treaty. The above proposals do not claim to be exhaustive and will need to be fleshed out in the wider consultations to be held by the interdepartmental working groups. The goal of this modernisation exercise is to revive the original philosophy of the Community method but to do so with an attitude that is:
–	more assertive in the provision of information on the key Union projects (Approach 2.1);
–	more accountable to the public, thanks to a clearer chain of decision‑making (Approach 2.2);
–	more inclusive of the political and administrative authorities on the ground, organised in circles or networks, in what will soon be an enlarged Europe (Approach 2.3).
This is very much a long‑term project. It will mean learning from one another and exchanging best practice as we go along, building on experiments already launched by the Commission, the Member States and Parliament.
It will also call for a redefinition of the Commission’s tasks, as an adjunct to the administrative reforms already under way. The ultimate goal, under the impact of the forthcoming enlargement, is to return to the original notion of a task‑oriented administration. The price will be selectivity. But it is in this direction that the prospect of democratic governance points (Proposal 16).
At the same time, an inclusive network‑based relationship between the Commission and the other public players in the Union will encourage a vision of power‑sharing between the Union and its Member States rather than an a priori demarcation of responsibilities. The quest for democratic governance in a “project‑based Union” accords with a clear formulation of how to apply the principle of subsidiarity (Proposal 17).
Proposal 16: Refocusing the Commission’s tasks around a mission statement
The work programme published on 11 October stated: “The White Paper proposals ... will contribute to a renewed understanding of the tasks and ‘core business’ of the Commission that are enshrined in the Treaty ... given the new context of interdependence and interaction between various levels of government.”
A mission statement should be incorporated in the future White Paper on governance, under the collective responsibility of the full Commission. It should consist of a short text translating into political terms the tasks assigned to the Commission by the Treaty and spelling out how it intends to perform them in line with the principle of democratic governance. On the basis of this statement and taking into account the Union’s major projects (see Proposal 1), the various tasks currently carried out by Commission departments could be systematically analysed in such a way as to distinguish between core tasks and tasks which need not be made permanent.
The drafting of the mission statement could perhaps be entrusted to the group of interdepartmental working group “pilots”, with help from the Legal Service. The box below gives some provisional examples of the missions which the statement might include. The systematic analysis of tasks on the basis of the mission statement would be carried out as part of the implementation of the White Paper on European governance.

6: A political mission statement for the Commission

•	Act as advocate for the Union’s projects.
•	Devise and initiate rules and common policies in the general interest.
•	Promote the involvement of regional and local authorities and civil society.
•	Assume ultimate responsibility for executive functions vis‑à‑vis Parliament and the Council.
•	Facilitate the transfer of knowledge for the purpose of implementing the common policies.
•	Safeguard the quality of the common policies by monitoring the monitor.
•	Guarantee fair competition.

Proposal 17: Finding a better way of applying the principle of subsidiarity in a project‑based Union
The work programme adopted on 11 October stated: “With regard to the competences of the Union and the Member States, the work programme will focus on the improvement of the division of executive tasks. From the analysis in this field, lessons for the debate on the articulation of legislative competences may emerge.” The refocusing of the Commission’s tasks proposed here takes on board the vision of a Union concentrating on the realisation of a few major projects with widespread appeal. It is by rallying support for such projects rather than seeking to replace national allegiances by a wider collective identity that we will encourage the people of the Union – in existing Member States and applicant countries alike – to see themselves as Europeans. Taking this line of thinking a step further, the political purpose of the Union is not to supplant the existing States with a new super‑State, but to establish a system of shared legislative powers in order to carry through common projects.
The vision of a unifying, project‑based Union sits uneasily with a strict separation of powers between the different levels of regional and local administration. It is much more in tune with the potential for creativity and inspiration exemplified by the development of Europe‑wide networks.
So, rather than producing a list of powers, what we have to do is to define how subsidiarity is to be applied on the basis of “power‑sharing principles” specific to each of the Union’s major projects. The same principles clearly cannot be applied to the goal of “building the most efficient knowledge‑based economy in the world” and “seeking to secure a quality and diversity of life for future generations at least equivalent to that at the beginning of the century”.
These principles would be defined for each of the Union’s major policies, highlighting both the added value contributed by the Union and the specific responsibilities of the Member States and, where appropriate, of local authorities. They would clearly spell out the areas of exclusive competence. But their primary purpose would be to clarify the exercise of shared powers, on the basis of a subdivision into three levels. This subdivision would be reflected in the choice made from the instruments available to attain a given objective. The future White Paper on governance would show that there is a broad range to choose from, mainly involving the Community method, with the varying degrees of participation (Approach 2.2) and decentralisation (Approach 2.3) allowed under it, but also the parallel use of open coordination and the Community method in the strict sense (Proposal 11).
In the debate on political objectives in the run‑up to the 2004 IGC, the proposals in the White Paper on governance should be expanded to include ideas on a method for establishing a system of power‑sharing. This method would involve the definition of principles that are differentiated according to the Union’s major projects (Article 2 of the Treaty) and the policies designed to attain those objectives (Article 3) and should provide guidance for the implementation of subsidiarity and the application of proportionality, in particular by clarifying the subdivision of shared powers. This subdivision would be illustrated by the choice between different instruments for participation and decentralisation highlighted by the White Paper on European governance.
Consequently the terms governing enforcement of the constitutional guarantee for application of the subsidiarity principle by the Court of Justice would have to be revised.
2.5	Timetable and method
The White Paper on enhancing European governance will be directed as much, if not more, at the new players on the European scene as at the Member States and the European Council. It would therefore be logical to present it first to the European Parliament, then to the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
The Nice European Council charged the Swedish and Belgian Presidencies with the task of organising the successive stages (Gothenburg in June and Laeken in December) in the general debate leading up to the 2004 IGC. It is proposed that a ten‑page “prologue” setting out the broad policy thrust of the White Paper on governance be presented at Gothenburg at the same time as the report on the strategy for sustainable development. Bearing in mind the proposals on timing already made by the Commission, we suggest the following timetable.
–	Discussions and consultations on the proposals contained in this report (Part 2) to be continued and a record of the consultations to be laid before the Commission by the end of April.
–	Interdepartmental working groups to complete their reports and submit them to the Commission for approval by mid‑May; the reports could have the status of staff papers.
–	Commission to approve the consolidated report in the second half of June.
–	Prologue to the White Paper to be presented in Gothenburg.
–	White Paper on European governance to be presented first to the European Parliament in early July, and then to the Economic and Social Committee (also in July) and the Committee of the Regions (in September).
–	White Paper proposals to be discussed in the Member States and applicant countries from September onwards and a report on these discussions to be laid before the Laeken European Council; this report should provide input for the subsequent debate within the broader framework provided for by the Nice conclusions.
•	The drafting of the consolidated report and the reports of the interdepartmental working groups will also involve an editorial effort designed to provide illustrative examples and make the analyses and proposals accessible to a wide public, i.e. at the very least the new players on the European scene. 
•	The governance team, the interdepartmental working group “pilots”, DG Budget, DG Admin and the Task Force on Reform will be asked to study the practical implications of the White Paper proposals directly affecting the Commission, in order to tie them in with the administrative reforms currently under way. These implications should be set out, at least in general terms, in the final version of the White Paper.

Conclusion
The future White Paper on European governance will form part of the Commission’s contribution to the grand debate in the run‑up to the 2004 IGC, opening up a number of avenues for exploring the constitutional issues already identified at Nice.
–	It will first show that the issue of respective powers cannot be clarified until there has been clarification of the legislative and executive responsibilities under the Treaty as it stands. In so doing it will highlight the scope for greater decentralisation in the application of certain policies. Underpinned by the vision of a project‑based Union, it will propose a method for improving the way in which the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are applied. It will also announce specific Commission action for refocusing its tasks.
–	It will stress the importance of keeping the grand projects which give meaning to the European Union in the public eye. The possible incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Treaty would have an impact on the formulation of these projects and associated policies.
–	It will confer on the European Parliament a key role as the cornerstone of the Community method. The success of this method will depend increasingly on the quality of the executive function, which must be subject to democratic scrutiny. In time, national parliaments will share this scrutinising role, as networking techniques are introduced to Community policies. 
These proposals have been drawn up on the assumption that the present Treaty will remain unchanged, but the implication is also that, to be fully effective, democratic European governance will doubtless have to go beyond the bounds of the present Treaty. If the idea of European decision‑making agencies incorporating national regulators were to get off the ground, a proper basis would have to be established for their supervision by the European executive. The development of general legal instruments leaving the Commission, the Member States and local authorities to adopt the implementing arrangements would probably need to be anchored in the primary legislation. Similarly, if sub‑national, regional and local bodies are to participate fully, their status will have to be formally specified in the Treaty. And if the Union is to play its full part in the reform of world governance, institutional changes will be needed to consolidate its role in multilateral forums as a whole.
But the implications of democratic governance go even deeper, requiring a new balance between the Commission, the Council and Parliament, with greater legitimacy for the Commission in relation to both its partner institutions. The fact is that transparency on its own is not enough to guarantee the vitality of democracy. There is still no substitute for the process of political mediation dealing both with day‑to‑day developments and with the bigger picture.

ANNEX 1: List of interdepartmental working groups for the White Paper on governance
Pilot	Rapporteur	Monitor within the governance team	
1. Enhancing and enriching the public debate on Europe	
1 a. Building the European public area	
Niels THOGERSEN
	John WYLES
Benedicte CAREMIER	Agnès HUBERT	
1 b. Establishing European scientific benchmarks	
Rainer GEROLD
	Angela LIBERATORE
	Notis LEBESSIS	
2. Handling the preparation and implementation processes	
2 a. Formalising the right to be involved	
Luisella PAVAN-WOOLFE	Mary PRESTON
Martin KRÖGER	Agnès HUBERT	
2 b. Transparency of evaluation	
Helmut SCHMITT VON SYDOW	Hilkka SUMMA	Hartmut OFFELE	
2 c. Better lawmaking	
Susan BINNS
Agne PANTELOURI	Colette COTTER	Michel SOUBIES	
3. Improving the exercise of European responsibilities through decentralisation	
3 a. Horizontal decentralisation (agencies)	
Fernand SAUER	Antoine QUERO MUSSOT	Notis LEBESSIS	
3 b. Vertical decentralisation	
Jean-François
VERSTRYNGHE	Tomas GRONBERG	Stefaan DE RYNCK	
4. Coherence and cooperation in a networked Europe	
4 a. Convergence of national policies	
David COYNE	Marianne SEGERS
Fabiana PIERINI	Renaud DENUIT	
4 b. Organisation structures for trans-European networks	
Frans Reiner
DE BRUINE	Giorgio CLAROTTI	Michel SOUBIES	
4 c. Linking the various levels – European, national, regional, local	
Jean-Charles LEYGUES	Jean-Charles LEYGUES	Stefaan DE RYNCK	
5. Strengthening the Union’s contribution to world governance
Applying the European strategy of sustainable development on the world stage	
Robert MADELIN	Robin RATCHFORD
Ditte
Juul JORGENSEN	Wolfgang PAPE	
6. Strengthening the integration and strategic dimension of Union policies across the continent	
Defining the framework for a debate on the policies the Union needs	
Graham AVERY	Fabiana PIERINI	Jérôme VIGNON
Wolfgang PAPE	

ANNEX 2: Organisation and method for the preparation of the White Paper 
The governance team has set up a mode of operation with the other departments and outside partners which enables it to tap all possible contributions; things are already buzzing, which augurs well for the final outcome.
•	A decentralised modus operandi to collate and exchange ideas
The twelve interdepartmental working groups covering the six work areas were all up and running from the end of October. These working groups total over 80 members from 20 Directorates-General, each working group having ten or so members (some officials sit on more than one working group). At the same time the Directorates-General most involved in the reflection process (in particular SG, SJ, RECH, CCR, ENV, MARKT, AGRI, INFSO, ENTR, EAC, ENV, EMPL, SANCO, TAXUD) have set up their own internal “governance” units. Mutual accessibility between the working groups is provided by CIRCA, an outside network which guarantees uniform folders and enables the involvement of non-members consulted by the working groups.
The group of working group “pilots” held a first meeting on 10 January to take stock of the essential topics and to discuss the content and methodology of the report. It will meet again after the Commission’s deliberations on 20 March and will then meet more and more frequently as the time for presentation of the consolidated report draws nearer. The rapporteurs for the different working groups met for the first time on 14 February.
•	Communication tools in place
Information on the progress of work is disseminated mainly on the web.
–	A two-language newsletter (first issue distributed at the end of December) is currently sent out to 300 correspondents, mainly associations, diplomatic and administrative circles, the European institutions, think tanks, universities, journalists, etc.
–	A website, containing basic information on the project in general was created last autumn; as of 26 February it is regularly updated to provide access in two languages to the main documents of each of the twelve working groups and links to the European governance network. The address is: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/index_en.htm or 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/index_fr.htm.
Commission staff will also be kept informed by a special report to appear shortly in Commission en Direct.
•	Active involvement of academics and the specialised media
The issue of governance has dominated academic research in the field of the political sciences in Europe for the last decade or so. But studies dealing specifically with the normative aspects of making European governance more democratic are less common. That said, some momentum has been generated by the fifth framework programme for research and a number of seminars have been organised on the subject, notably by the European University Institute in Florence. The main multiannual research programmes of universities throughout Europe are providing valuable input for the deliberations of the Commission’s interdepartmental working groups on governance (One Europe or Several, University of Sussex; Arena, University of Oslo) as are the programmes of think tanks specialising in the analysis of European policies and institutions, such as “Notre Europe”, the Centre for European Reform, the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Association of Jean Monnet Chairs.
•	The European institutions already involved in the reflection process
The principal player in the European Parliament is the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (rapporteur Ms Kauffmann). The Parliamentary Group of the Party of European Socialists (PSE) has adopted a paper entitled Nouvelles formes de gouvernance européenne. Evaluation politique préliminaire par les coordinateurs du Groupe PSE, with the stated objective of influencing the White Paper. Also worth noting is the Conference of the European Union Speakers of Parliament (led by Mr Violante) held in September 2000, at which a Green Paper The future of Parliamentary democracy: transition and challenges in European governance was presented.
The regional pole is currently the most active in supplying the governance team with papers and opinions. In addition to the opinion already adopted by the Committee of the Regions (Lord Tope), ideas and analyses have come from the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, the CRPM, the Eurocities association, and many national associations, in particular in the United Kingdom and Italy, where governance has prompted a stream of correspondence from individual local and regional authorities.
In the Economic and Social Committee an opinion specifically on European governance is being prepared and should be adopted at the 25-26 April plenary session.
•	Differing degrees of interest shown by national governments
The reaction to the governance issue has been keenest in the United Kingdom, with two government-level seminars (London on 31 October and Wiston House on 2 February).
In Germany a standing working party chaired by the Land of Bremen has been set up by the Länder to consider the preparation of the White Paper. A first meeting was held in Bremen in October; this will be followed by a one-day workshop in Dresden in March. The governance team is playing a direct part in the proceedings of this working party, which has already produced a critical report of some substance (December 2000).
The Swedish and Belgian Governments have shown interest in the project in connection with their respective responsibilities in 2001 in relation to the debate on the future of the Union.
•	Three studies of substance
The governance team is simultaneously conducting three studies designed to provide input for the analyses:
–	an opinion poll – qualitative and quantitative – covering for the first time all the applicant countries and the present members of the Union;
–	a detailed analysis of the number and type of infringement proceedings brought by the Commission against Member States; this involves inquiries in the Member States into the organisation of national systems for coordinating the process for the application of Community law; the analysis will provide a basis for conclusions on the improvements which can be made in this area.
–	a seminar on the regulation of powers in various federal systems.
•	Numerous hearings and preparatory seminars
–	February: 6 half-day hearings of experts on enlargement, half of them from the Union countries and the other half from the applicant countries (group 6).
–	March: 13-14 March: hearing on decentralisation
  16 March: hearing on governance, subsidiarity and proportionality.
–	Starting in March too, a sounding board of six leading figures will assist with the preparation of the consolidated report.