The Jean Monnet Program
Professor J.H.H. Weiler
European Union Jean Monnet Chair

in cooperation with the 

Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law

Professor Armin von Bogdandy
Director of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law

European Integration: The New German Scholarship

Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03

Franz Mayer

The European Constitution and the Courts
Adjudicating European constitutional law in a multilevel system

Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law

Heidelberg, 24-27 February 2003

All rights reserved.
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form
without permission of the author.

This project was funded by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. 

ISSN 1087-2221
© Franz Mayer 2003
	New York University School of Law and	
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law
The European Constitution and the Courts

Adjudicating European constitutional law in a multilevel system
Franz C. Mayer*
Contents	

Introduction 
I. Taking Stock: The ECJ and the supreme national courts – conflict or cooperation? 
2. Adopting a substantive perspective on the courts’ relationship
3. Interim summary
II. Adopting an analytical and a theoretical perspective
1. Dealing with the question of ultimate jurisdiction
2. Adopting a theoretical perspective
3. Interim summary
III. Prospective developments in the relationship between European and national courts
1. Topics of the constitutional debate until 2004
2. Open questions
Summary and conclusion

Introduction
  “In Europe the judge has never been merely la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi”, exclaimed the German Constitutional Tribunal (the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG)) in 1987.  This statement applies as well to European constitutional law, regardless of the distinct legal traditions of its Member States. Thus, the question of who has the final say in legal matters within the EU multilevel system of governance, and hence in the relationship between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the highest courts of the Member States is twofold in nature. The interplay of the respective courts is not only the subject of the study of European constitutional law doctrine, but the courts themselves are also active participants in the shaping of this same European constitutional law. 
This analysis of the relationship between the two levels of courts therefore has to begin with an assessment of their jurisprudence (see infra, I.), followed by a theoretical breakdown of the case-law (see infra, II.). I will conclude with observations on the prospects for future development of the relationship between European and national courts (see infra, III.). 
I. Taking Stock: The ECJ and the supreme national courts – conflict or cooperation?
The highest court at the European level is the ECJ in Luxembourg, but the situation is less clear at the national level. Therefore, the first step is to identify the national adjudicating bodies that function as the ECJ’s ‚interlocutors‘. 
The relevant adjudicating entities in the present context are constitutional courts and supreme courts. Special constitutional courts exist, alongside specialised high courts in Germany (BVerfG), Austria (Verfassungsgerichtshof), Italy (Corte Costituzionale), Portugal (Tribunal Constitucional), Spain (Tribunal Constitucional), and since 1996 also in Luxembourg (Cour Constitutionnelle). Ireland (Supreme Court) and Denmark (Højesteret) have supreme courts that are also constitutional courts. In Great Britain, it is the second chamber of Parliament, the House of Lords, that exercises the functions of a constitutional and a supreme court. 
In the Netherlands, we can find a number of specialised courts of equal rank, inter alia  the Raad van State and the Hoge Raad. The situation is similar in Sweden, where the highest (specialised) courts are the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) and the Supreme Administrative Court (Regeringsrätten), as well as in Finland (Korkein oikeus, Supreme Court, and Korkein hallinto-oikeus, Supreme Administrative Court). Swedish judges of the two supreme courts also form a Council (Lagrådet) to exercise a non-binding review of draft legislation, whereas Finland has a Constitutional Committee of Parliament (Perustuslakivaliokunta), to control its draft legislation. (Lagrådet) 
In France, there is no formal constitutional court aside from the highest courts for administrative law (Conseil d’Etat ) and for civil and criminal law (Cour de  cassation). The Conseil constitutionnel, originally limited to the review of draft legislation, does increasingly exercise the role of a constitutional court. 
Finally, Belgium has specialised supreme courts (Conseil d'Etat and Cour de cassation), and since 1983 a constitutional court that specialises in, but is also limited to, controlling the exercise of competencies, the Cour d’arbitrage. In Greece, there are several supreme specialised courts, the Symvoulio Epikrateias (Council of State), the Elegktiko Synedrio (Court of auditors) and the Areios Pagos (Supreme Court). Beyond that, there is a Special Supreme Court, the Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio, which is composed of judges from the highest specialised courts. 
To solve conflicts and contradictions between these courts, similar institutions can typically be found in other systems with specialised high courts of equal rank.  In France, there is a Tribunal des Conflits between Cour de cassation and Conseil d'Etat, and in Germany, there is a Gemeinsamer Senat der obersten Bundesgerichte (Joint Chamber of the Highest Federal Courts).
This summary of the highest courts of the Member States leaves us with a rather heterogeneous picture. On one side, there are some parallels and similarities, sometimes even amounting to familial relationships. Consider the Austrian Constitutional Court, the Verfassungsgerichtshof (öVfGH), to some extent ‘the mother’ of all constitutional courts in Europe, as it served as a model for the German, Italian and the Spanish Constitutional Courts. Likewise, the French model of supervising the use of administrative law in the form of a Council of State may also be found in Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Luxembourg.
But contrasts prevail: traditional and venerable institutions (such as the House of Lords in Great Britain or the Conseil d‘Etat in France) may be found alongside newly created institutions (the Cour d’arbitrage in Belgium or the Cour Constitutionelle in Luxembourg). Courts with comprehensive powers (BVerfG, öVfGH) operate side by side with less powerful tribunals. Sometimes, there are no specific constitutional courts at all (Denmark, Ireland); sometimes, it is the mere idea of constitutional adjudication or judicial review that is not compatible with the constitutional traditions of a Member State (e.g. in France, Finland, and the Netherlands).

One way to improve our understanding of the relationship between the ECJ and the respective supreme national courts is to examine the link between the court-levels already foreseen by the treaties. This is a procedural link: the preliminary reference procedure under Art. 234 EC (see infra, 1.) Apart from this, there are areas of substantive constitutional law that have shaped the relationship between the courts. These include the issue of fundamental rights protection as well as the question of who controls the limits of the EU’s  competencies (see infra, 2.)
1. Adopting a procedural perspective: The duty to make preliminary references under Art. 234(3) EC 
European law imposes a duty on national courts to make preliminary references, that is to request certification, to the ECJ in two cases. In the first case, any court or tribunal of a Member State that has doubts about the validity of European law has to make a reference, as the ECJ claims a monopoly to decide upon the validity of European law. The second case is the duty to make references to the ECJ under Art. 234(3) EC, which requires that ”a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law” shall bring also questions of mere interpretation of European law before the ECJ. Thus, there are concrete obligations for supreme national courts flowing from primary law as interpreted by the ECJ (see infra, a). The national courts‘ obedience to these duties, however, is here subject to empirical scrutiny (see infra, b).
a) Supreme national courts and the duty to make references from the perspective of European law
Following attempts of national courts, in particular  the attempt of the French Conseil d’Etat, to establish a category of ‚clear and obvious interpretation‘ (acte clair ) in interpreting EC law, the ECJ decided the matter by means of its own EC-law doctrine of acte clair which establishes an extremely strict standard. According to the CILIFT decision, the only cases in which it is safe to assume that there is no duty to refer a question to the ECJ is either when the question is not relevant for the national court’s decision or when the interpretation of EC law is obvious. This is the case only when the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no room for any reasonable doubt. Under the CILFIT-criteria, the national court or tribunal has to be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the ECJ. The existence of such a possibility must be “assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the Community.” In this situation, the ECJ will normally not make a statement on the relevance of the reference for the judgment of the national court.
From the perspective of European law, a national court decision that violates these principles established by the ECJ is a breech of Arts. 226 and 227 EC. A court or tribunal of last instance that disregards its duties to make a preliminary reference violates Art. 234(3) EC. The principle of the independence of the judiciary  notwithstanding, acts of courts or tribunals are attributed to the respective Member State. In that respect, European law adopts a public international law approach towards the Member States. According to Art. 228 EC, the ECJ may even, on request of the Commission and under certain conditions, impose a lump sum or penalty payment on a Member State that does not comply. 
To date, there have been no Treaty infringement proceedings against Member States resulting from decisions of the national courts. To the extent that the Commission has engaged into the preliminary procedure foreseen in Art. 226 EC, the Commission has confined itself to ensuring that its view be made clear to the non-complying courts, thus acknowledging the principal of judicial independence, and only in cases of repeat problems admonishing the respective national government to take legislative actin. Notorious member state court decisions, such as the Cohn-Bendit decision of the French Conseil d'Etat  or the Maastricht decision of the German BVerfG, have not led the Commission to begin formal infringement proceedings.
The absence of infringement proceedings in these cases can be explained by a strategy that the Commission has adopted towards national courts. Answering a written question from a member of the European Parliament, the Commission stated in 1983 that infringement proceedings do not constitute an appropriate basis for cooperation between the ECJ and the national courts. According to the Commission, the procedure was not designed as a blanket means to review national court decisions, but rather for use only in cases of systematic and intentional disregard of Art. 177 EEC (now Art. 234 EC).
In this development, the limitations of an exclusively positivist view towards more accurately defining the relationship between the national supreme courts and the ECJ becomes apparent. 
b) The preliminary reference practice of supreme national courts
The German BVerfG has to date not made any reference to the ECJ.  It has stated in the Solange I decision of 1974 and in the Vielleicht decision of 1979 that it is in principal bound to Art. 234 EC. However,  the BVerfG has not reviewed the issue of its own obligations under Art. 234 EC following the ECJ’s CILFIT decision of 1982. It has limited itself to specifying the conditions under which the highest specialised German courts are obliged to make references. The Tribunal’s reluctance to use Art. 234 EC or even to clarify its own position on Art. 234 EC was particularly noteworthy in the Maastricht decision of 1993,  in which the Tribunal reserved for itself the right to review the exercise of competencies of European institutions in light of the German constitution (see infra). During the proceedings, the BVerfG utilized a rather original solution in solving questions of EC-law interpretation, by hearing the Director General of the Commission Legal Service as a witness, instead of making a reference to the ECJ. Furthermore, in the NPD-proceedings of 2001, the BVerfG had the unique opportunity to make a principal statement on its obligations under Art. 234 EC in a case where it was unquestionably the court of first and last instance (the proceedings to declare a political party unconstitutional under Art. 21 of the German constitution). The BVerfG also did not use this chance. 

The German court is not alone, however. Other supreme courts have also avoided making references to the ECJ. The Italian Corte Costituzionale in its Giampaoli decision of 1991  admitted the possibility, albeit not the obligation, to make references under Art. 234 EC, only to reverse itself at a later date: pointing to the fact that it is not a court in the sense of Art. 234 EC and thus unable to enter into direct contact with the ECJ by means of a preliminary reference, the Corte Costituzionale declared in the Messagero Servizi  of 1995 that it did not consider itself bound by Art. 234 EC.  Instead, the Corte Costituzionale  ordered the court of the previous instance to make a reference to the ECJ. 
The Spanish Tribunal Constitucional (TC) has also not made any references yet, and is even reluctant to involve itself in the cases of non-reference of the other Spanish courts. According to the TC, the application of European law is not an issue of constitutional law, and thus not part of the TC’s jurisdiction. Legal protection against Spanish acts that infringe upon European law, the TC holds, is accorded by the regular Spanish courts and the ECJ. The Portuguese Tribunal Constitucional considers itself bound under Art. 234(3) EC, but still has yet to make a reference.
The French Conseil d’Etat has made references to the ECJ both before and after the Cohn-Bendit case, dating back to 1970. Still, the Conseil d’Etat issued decisions not compatible with ECJ jurisprudence and in disregard of Art. 234(3) EC, even after the ECJ’s CILFIT decision. The Cour de cassation made its first reference in 1967, while the Conseil constitutionnel has not yet done so. 
The highest Belgian courts, the Conseil d'Etat  and the Cour de cassation  began to make references early, in 1967 and in 1968. The Cour d’arbitrage, created in 1983, first made a reference in 1997. The highest Dutch courts started making references in the early seventies (the Raad van State in 1973, the Hoge Raad in 1974 ) and have continued doing so on a regular basis. The Luxembourg Cour de Cassation made its first reference in 1967, and the Luxembourg Conseil d’Etat joined in only in 1981. The Cour Constitutionnelle is probably still too new an institution, and has not made any references yet.
The British House of Lords made a first reference in 1979. Further references have followed on a regular basis.  The Danish Højesteret may be one of the more sceptical courts as far as European integration is concerned, but it has made numerous references to the ECJ, the first one in 1978. The Irish Supreme Court began to make references in 1983  and has continued such practice regularly since then. The highest Greek courts are also on record with references. The Symvoulio Epikrateias (Council of State) has made references on a regular basis, starting early in 1983. Occasional references have been made by the Elegktiko Synedrio (Court of Auditors) since 1993, and since 1996, there are also references every now and then from the Areios Pagos (Supreme Court). The Supreme Special Court (Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio) has not made any references yet.
The Swedish Högsta domstolen made a first reference almost immediately after Swedish accession in 1995. The Swedish Regeringsrätten followed just two years later in 1997. The Lagrådet, which effectuates non-binding control of draft legislation, has not made any references. The supreme Finish administrative court Korkein hallinto-oikeus has been making references on a regular basis since 1996. The supreme court, Korkein oikeus is on record with its first question stemming from 1999. The Constitutional Committee of Parliament (Perustuslakivaliokunta) has not made any references so far, while the Austrian Constitutional Court, the VfGH, early on acknowledged the option to submit references under Art. 234 EC, and it has first made a reference to the ECJ in 1999. 
c) The national supreme courts’ reference practices – a mixed bag?
This brief assessment above of the national courts’ reference practices reveals several contradictory points. On the one hand, the strict standard imposed by the ECJ’s CILFIT-formula is cushioned by a Commission practice that does not sanction non-certification as an infringement under the treaty infringement proceedings. On the other hand, there are important courts and tribunals at the Member State level that do not make references to the ECJ. A similar approach to the BVerfG’s non-reference practice, which is actually not compatible with the German constitution’s fundamental right of ‘access to the lawful judge’ (Recht auf den gesetzlichen Richter, Art. 101(1) of the German constitution) and with Art. 23 of the German constitution,  exists as well in Italy and in Spain. This thus indicates that those nations that established particularly strong constitutional courts in the aftermath of dictatorial regimes follow a different path in their dealings with a European court. These three courts remain a minority, however, when contrasted with other courts in the EU. 
References are made by both the ancient British House of Lords and the rather Euro-sceptical Danish Højesteret, as well as from the Austrian VfGH, a genuinely specialised constitutional court in a similar position as the Spanish, Italian and German constitutional tribunals. 
A closer look at the courts that have not yet made references reveals several motivations, ranging from the way these courts see themselves, to constraints imposed by their respective national constitutions, to a simple lack of opportunities to make references. There is also the question whether the ECJ’s alleged self-constraint to the matters of European law – as opposed to directly commenting on national law – is not a fiction, which would also explain national courts’ scepticism. From these motivations, the hypothesis of the courts’ self-image, i.e. seeing themselves as guardians of their (respective) constitution, seems to have the greatest weight. 
In any case, an analysis of the national courts’ procedural points of contact with the ECJ suggests that there are open questions. The sole binary empirical question of reference or non-reference is too simple, though, to explain what exactly the constitutional law patterns are that drive the relationship between the national courts and the ECJ. To answer this question, we will have to turn to a more substantive analysis. 
2.	Adopting a substantive perspective on the courts’ relationship
a) The perspective of the ECJ
The ECJ claims the monopoly on invalidating (secondary ) European law. The ECJ reviews Community acts under Art. 230 EC, as either incidental questions under Art. 241 EC or in the context of a reference under Art. 234 EC. 
In 1987, the ECJ held in the Foto-Frost-case  that national courts are entitled to consider the validity of community acts and to conclude that a community act is completely valid, as ”by taking that action they are not calling into question the existence of the Community measure”. But the ECJ also made it very clear that national courts do not have the power to declare acts of community institutions invalid, arguing for the unity of the Community legal order and for the need for legal certainty. Moreover, the Court points to the ”necessary coherence of the system of judicial protection established by the Treaty”, that gives the ECJ ”the exclusive jurisdiction to declare void an act of a Community institution”. The ECJ emphasises that it is in the best position to decide on the validity of Community acts, as all Community institutions whose acts are challenged are entitled to participate in the ECJ proceedings and can therefore supply the information that the ECJ considers necessary for the purposes of the case before it.  
As far as interim measures are concerned, the ECJ has given national courts some leeway to make statements on the validity of European law, all the while insisting on its exclusive powers to determine the validity of these acts as well.
The proceedings lined out derive their conclusiveness from Art. 219 EC, according to which the Member States commit themselves to not solving disputes over the interpretation or implementation of the treaty in any other way than is provided for in the treaty. Moreover, the obligation of national courts to respect the interpretation of European law as established by the ECJ under Arts. 220 et seq. EC could also be justified as an obligation arising under Art. 10 EC (the Member States’ obligations arising out of the Treaty). 
In addition to arguments provided by the ECJ in its relevant decisions, another possible explanation for the ECJ’s restrictive approach lies in the Court’s image of itself as the ‘driving force’ behind European integration.  If this indeed is the court’s conception of itself, conflicts of interest with national courts would seem unavoidable. This cautious attitude of the ECJ may also be explained by a certain distrust the ECJ harbours against the national courts, which - given a wide latitude in their decision-making - could well try to resist increasing integration through jurisprudence.
The real argument behind the ECJ’s reluctance to give the national courts more control, however, lies in the principle of the supremacy of European law in the case of a conflict of laws as it was developed  by the ECJ.  The ECJ’s core justifications for the supremacy of European law are independence, uniformity and efficacy of Community law. In this perspective, Community law is “an integral part of  [...] the legal order applicable in the territory of each of the Member States”, provisions of Community law ”by their entry into force render automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of current national law”. This concept of supremacy in application, Anwendungsvorrang (as opposed to supremacy in validity, Geltungsvorrang), also applies to the Member States’ constitutional law provisions: 
”The validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that state or the principles of a national constitutional structure.” 
The critics of the Court’s supremacy concept are numerous. Among other things, they have pointed out a structural parallel between supreme European law and the law of (military) occupation  (!) and have criticised the ‘rigorous simplicity’ of the concept of supremacy. The absoluteness of the ECJ’s vision of European law supremacy over each and every norm of municipal law - including any provision of the municipal constitutions - has raised the question of whether the ECJ might have overstepped its competencies by establishing such an absolute concept of supremacy. According to this view, the ECJ’s role is to interpret European law – but the question of how the Member States’ legal orders handle conflicts between the Member States’ legal orders and European law, so the critics say, goes beyond a mere question of interpretation.
Admittedly, the ECJ has remained oddly unclear in its statements on the exact source of supremacy and of European law itself - even relative to the limited language the ECJ normally utilises in its decisions - merely alluding to what kind of organisation the Community is. The formula used by the Court, however, has evolved over the years, from a new “legal order of international law” (1963), followed by the formula “own legal system” (1964), and the concept of the Treaty as “the basic constitutional charter” (1986)  or “the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law” (1991). This constitutional dimension of the European legal order does emphasise the autonomy of European law, but it does not clearly state a separation between EU law and the legal order of the Member States. Rather, this interpretation holds out European law as the overarching legal order within a community of law, which at the same time is taken up and complemented by the Member States’ respective legal orders.
b) The perspective of the supreme national courts
aa) The German BVerfG
In its decision of 5 July 1967, its first to discuss Community law in detail, the BVerfG emphasised a central role for the “act of assent” to the founding treaties (the Zustimmungsgesetz, a federally enacted law under Art. 24, today  Art. 23 of the German constitution).  Later commentators likened this central role to that of a bridge   between EC law and national law, in that – in the German view – the act of assent functions as the decisive ‘order to give legal effect’ (Rechtsanwendungsbefehl) to European law. That very same year, the BVerfG expressed its view of the Community as distinct public authority in a distinct legal order (Gemeinschaft als eigenständige Hoheitsgewalt in einer eigenständigen Rechtsordnung). This view is still held today. The BVerfG qualified the EEC-Treaty as a ‘constitution, as it were, of this Community’ (gewissermaßen die Verfassung dieser Gemeinschaft)  and Community law as a ‘distinct legal order, whose norms neither belong to public international law nor belong to the national law of the Member States’ (eigene Rechtsordnung, deren Normen weder Völkerrecht noch nationales Recht der Mitgliedstaaten sind). The BVerfG hinted, though, at constitutional limitations on the transfer of public authority rights (Übertragung von Hoheitsrechten) to the EC in the context of the German constitution’s guarantee of fundamental rights. An answer to this question, however, was not forthcoming at this stage. Not yet. 
 (1) Fundamental rights: The Solange I and II decisions (1974/1986)
In the Solange I decision of 29 May 1974, the BVerfG stipulated constitutional limits on the supremacy of European law and reserved a right of judicial review in order to safeguard the fundamental rights guaranteed by the German constitution. The BVerfG asserted that in a case of conflict between EC law and the fundamental rights of the German constitution, the German constitution’s fundamental rights would prevail.  
A five to three majority of the second senate of the Court  supported the main elements of the decision.  In regard to the principal limits of EC law supremacy, inalienable essentials of the German constitution and the ‘division of labour’ between the BVerfG and the ECJ, the decision still stands today. 
The position adopted by the dissenting minority, however, is interesting and deserves closer attention. The minority’s approach to the relationship between German constitutional law and Community law was not only much closer to the ECJ’s view than the Court majority’s view, but it also went much further than the BVerfG’s Solange II decision, which was in fact a volte face from its Solange I judgment.
According to the minority, the German constitution’s fundamental rights standard cannot be applied to EC secondary law. The EEC-Treaty has established an original legal order, whose law is safeguarded by the ECJ. The Community legal order, the dissenting judges continue, is autonomous and independent from national law. This Community legal order and German law have each in their sphere their own set of fundamental rights provisions with corresponding court systems. Next, the dissenting judges refer to the fundamental rights established by the ECJ up to 1974, dealing in great detail with the ECJ’s Nold decision, published just two weeks before the Solange I decision. This proves that the ECJ decision which the BVerfG would 12 years later in Solange II refer to as ‘an essential step’  towards a sufficient fundamental rights protection standard at the European level was already known to the BVerfG in 1974. The minority also emphasises that the duty to acknowledge the acts of supranational institutions, recognised by the BVerfG itself, excludes from the outset any kind of national control over these acts, as the Federal Republic relinquished this right by joining the EEC. Among these acts that are to be accepted without any further national control, the minority continues, are also the legislative acts of the European institutions with European law taking precedence over conflicting provisions of national law. 
The minority, however, then goes on to confirm the opinion of the majority of the judges that EC law has supremacy over domestic law only to the extent that the German constitution allows a transfer of public authority to the Community institutions. It is also true, the dissenting judges say, that the German constitution does not allow for an unlimited transfer of these powers, as the pre-condition for this transfer is that the public power of the supranational Community, acting under its legal order, is subject to the same restrictions as flow from the basic principles of the German constitution for the German public power. In the case of the EEC, however, the dissenting judges consider these conditions fulfilled. The dissenting judges also warn that the majority decision of the BVerfG is at odds with the jurisprudence of the ECJ. The BVerfG does not have the right to apply the German constitution’s standards in general and the fundamental rights standard in particular to provisions of EC law in order to make statements on the validity of EC law. That the majority claims this power is in the opinion of the minority a clear infringement of the powers reserved to the ECJ and incompatible with Art. 24(1) of the German constitution.
In conclusion, the minority considers the BVerfG’s reservation of a constitutional check on EC law – a reservation that the Solange II decision maintains (see infra) – to be illegal. And although the minority also considers the transfer of public authority to the Community to be limited in principle, they do not establish any controls grounded in national constitutional law. 

After indicating a change of its Solange I jurisprudence in July 1979, twice in 1981  and then again in February 1983, the Solange II decision of 22 October 1986  brought the long-expected supplement to the Solange I decision, which – without renouncing the principle of a constitutional law check – defused the fundamental rights issue ‘in a pragmatic sense’.  The BVerfG did insist that the transfer of public authority to supranational institutions be subject to constitutional limits: there is no authorisation, it held, to give up the identity of the German constitutional order by means of transferring competencies to supranational institutions with the result of an ‘intrusion into the fundamental architecture, the constituting structures’ of the constitution (durch Einbruch in ihr Grundgefüge, in die sie konstituierenden Strukturen). Nevertheless, the BVerfG holds after an extensive assessment of the development of EC law: ‘as long as’ (solange) an effective protection of fundamental rights is guaranteed at the European level, with a level of protection which is substantially equivalent (im wesentlichen gleichzuachten) to the inalienable minimum level of protection of fundamental rights under the German constitution, including a general guarantee of the essential substance (Wesensgehalt) of the fundamental rights, the BVerfG ’will no longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of derived Community law, that may constitute the legal basis for acts of German courts or authorities in the Federal Republic’..
The fundamental rights-section of the 1993 Maastricht decision   and the 2000 Banana decision   have basically confirmed the BVerfG’s statement of principle in Solange II. The BVerfG has re-confirmed in a decision of 2001 that it considers the standard of fundamental rights protection to be safeguarded: although the BVerfG does not contribute to this safeguarding of European fundamental rights by making references to the ECJ, it does contribute by supervising the duty to make references of the regular German courts, using as a basis the German constitution’s fundamental right of ‘access to the lawful judge’ (Recht auf den gesetzlichen Richter, Art. 101(1) of the German constitution), thus considering the European judge a ‘lawful judge’ under the German constitution. 
(2) Powers and competencies: The German Maastricht decision (1993)
With the Maastricht decision of 12 October 1993, the BVerfG established a constitutional law reserve of power over the exercise of competencies by the EU/EC. Accordingly, the BVerfG may examine whether acts at the European level conform to the boundaries set for the transfer of public powers to the EU. The Court justifies its right of control over ultra vires acts (in the decision, the Court says ausbrechende Rechtsakte, ‘acts breaking out’) by pointing to the constraints of German constitutional law. What the Court actually does within that concept amounts to an independent interpretation of European law: according to the BVerfG, the plan of integration  outlined in the act of assent (Zustimmungsgesetz) and in the EU-Treaty cannot be substantially altered later on by means of European ultra vires acts without losing the cover provided by the act of assent. Taking a closer look at this argument, one realises that this amounts to a doubling of the relevant standards. European acts have to be compatible with the guarantees of the German constitution and, of course, with European law. This becomes the case because the BVerfG would actually review the act of assent to the extent that it covers a given European act. This European act would then thus be reviewed by the standard of a ‘German version’ of European law (the ‘Constitutional-law-version’ of EU law). The alleged limitation on scrutinising the act of assent under a German constitutional law-standard only thus seems to be a trick: in actuality, the compatibility of an European act with German constitutional law depends on its compatibility with European law – that is, the way the BVerfG interprets European law. 
As far as ECJ acts are concerned, the Maastricht decision remains unclear about how, in practice, to draw the line between the (permitted) development of the law by the European judge and the (prohibited) development of judge-made European law, or between substantial alterations of the European competence provisions and still acceptable alterations. 
The legal consequences of deeming an European act ultra vires would be that this act would not be binding in Germany. This amounts to a German constitutional law based reserve of power over European acts, that restricts the supremacy of European law. In such a situation, the BVerfG takes on the role of guardian. 

All things considered, one may well say that the Maastricht decision is within a certain continuity of the BVerfG’s prior jurisprudence on fundamental rights, as far as the concept of a constitutional law reserve of control that restricts the European law-claim for supremacy is concerned. What is striking, though, is the aggressive tone of the decision when compared to previous decisions. 
One should also note a crucial difference between the fundamental rights issue (Solange II) and the competence issue (Maastricht): as for the competence issue, the reproach with which the European level is confronted in case of an ultra vires-act goes beyond the bipolar relationship between the German constitutional order and the European legal order. The categories of an ultra vires-act on the one hand and an act infringing on the fundamental rights laid down in the German constitution on the other hand are utterly different. And why is that? The absence of a certain aspect of fundamental rights protection in the jurisprudence of the ECJ can occur either for procedural reasons already or because the range of a given fundamental right is defined differently at the European and national levels. In that case, the BVerfG’s formula for a cooperative relationship (Kooperationsverhältnis) between (zwischen ) the BVerfG and ECJ in the sense of a spare or reserve guarantee in line with the Solange II jurisprudence appears totally plausible. To uphold, in principle, the standard of fundamental rights protection guaranteed by the German constitution does not necessarily imply a reproach against the European level; it does not go beyond the bipolar relationship between German and European legal orders. 
This is different in the case of a reproach of an ultra vires-act: there is no leeway for a relationship of cooperation between the BVerfG and ECJ where the question of the limits of European competencies is concerned. Declaring an act to be ultra vires always implies a defect in the act. It would also imply a reproach to the European level and especially to the ECJ. Moreover, the reproach of an ultra vires-act would also concern the validity and/or application of European law in all other Member States, as an act cannot be ultra vires only in the bipolar relationship between one Member State and the EU. This is hence a frontal attack on (European) judge-made European law.
Imposing the strict standard implicitly suggested by the BVerfG on the principles of interpretation of European law as  developed by the ECJ would significantly reduce the ECJ’s latitude. This kind of constraint would reach beyond the EU-Treaty, the actual subject of the Maastricht decision, and extend to European law in general. By implying a duty of the ECJ to police the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality at the European level in a specific way, the BVerfG claims the power to scrutinise  difficult balancing decisions undertaken by the ECJ as well as the development of European law influenced by the ECJ.

The immediate effects of the Maastricht decision have been limited. Still, at least one court, a Financial Court of the first instance (the Finanzgericht Rheinland-Pfalz) has declared an EC-act to be ultra vires. Other courts (the BGH, the OVG Münster, the BFH and also the VG Frankfurt ) have been extremely liberal in making use of the concept of EC ultra vires acts, without actually declaring any act to be ultra vires. These decisions have revealed quite different understandings of what an ultra vires-act may be, extending to an understanding that would make any illicit European act an ultra vires-act, no matter what nature the legal defect of the act in question actually is. 
In doctrinal writings, the BVerfG’s concept of ultra vires acts has been severely critiqued by some, but welcomed by others, to the extent that it has been used as an argument against alleged ultra vires acts stemming from the EC, in particular from the ECJ (the ECJ decisions in the Süderdithmarschen, Alcan and Kreil-cases). What is striking is the sharpness of the debate, at least among some of the German scholars. In any case, the Federal administrative court BVerwG and even the BVerfG itself have clearly rejected any attempt to depict the ECJ’s Alcan decision as an invalid and thus irrelevant ultra vires-act. 
One may ask, though, what the concept of competencies is behind the ultra vires-accusations concerning the ECJ’s decisions in the Süderdithmarschen- and the Alcan-cases. The argument that the ECJ does not have the ‘competencies to regulate’ in the sense of legislative powers suggests erroneously that the ECJ decisions in question contain some kind of quasi-legislative regulation of a competence area, such as court procedure or administrative procedure. Even if there may be some truth in depicting numerous decisions of the ECJ where it insists and pretends that it is merely interpreting positive law as blunt, to use a friendly word - what the ECJ does in the Alcan-case is simply enforcing the European control of state-aids, that’s all.
Moreover, it is also doubtful whether the Maastricht decision’s initial concept of ultra vires acts actually covers this kind of reasoning in the first place, as there is no doubt that the control of state aids is in the realm of European competencies. The wording of the Maastricht decision seems to indicate that the BVerfG was aiming at ultra vires acts in a narrow sense, as acts beyond the scope of European competencies, in other words, as acts that transcend the realm of European jurisdiction. It did not seem to aim at the separation of powers-question of which institution at that level has what powers. And surely the BVerfG did not want to introduce some kind of general legality check on European law, to consider any kind of formal or substantial legal defect of European acts. 
(3) The consistency of the BVerfG’s case-law: controlling the bridge
In summary, one can say that, in spite of the BVerfG’s recognition of the  autonomy of the Community legal order, one can say that the BVerfG has always seen the acts of assent to the respective treaties, based on Art. 24 (today  Art. 23) of the German constitution, as the link between European law and national law, with the Member States remaining the ‘Masters of the Treaties’. Moreover, this is a linear, continuous link, and not a one-time link that becomes irrelevant once the German legal order has been ‘opened up’ to European law. Policing this link, or, to come back to Paul Kirchhof’s metaphor, controlling this bridge, enables the BVerfG to effectuate far-reaching indirect control over the application of European law by applying to it the standard of German constitutional law under the guise of interpreting and controlling the act of assent.  
The alleged ”auto-limitation” policy of the BVerfG, according to which the BVerfG and ECJ adjudicate in spheres independent of each other, merely acts to blur the fact that policing the constitutional limits imposed on transfers of public authority under Arts. 23/24 of the German constitution amounts to an indirect control of European law. And the BVerfG indeed consistently imposes constitutional law limits on the supremacy of European law. These constitutional limits justify the BVerfG’s claim of entitlement to control European law as the guardian of the German constitution. 
It should be noted that the BVerfG has never surrendered/relinquished its claim to a right to decide [the point at which/on how] it would leverage its constitutional control; it merely modified this threshold. This is especially visible in the Solange I/Solange II shift, where the Court reversed what it considered to be the principle and what the exception. Only the dissenting opinion in the Solange I case indicated a willingness to completely abandon a right of judicial review over the constitutionality of the European law, albeit insisting on constitutional law limits. Of course, the difference between the fundamental rights issue and the ultra vires issue should be borne in mind, as ‘ultra vires acts’ and ‘acts violating fundamental rights as accorded by the German constitution’ are different categories.
bb) Other high courts
Claims of some form of last instance reserve of power over the legality of European law can be found in Italy (in the Corte Costituzionale’s decisions in the Frontini  and Fragd-cases ); Ireland (in the Supreme Court-cases on abortion ); Denmark (in the Højesteret’s Rasmussen decision of 1998, the Danish Maastricht case ); Greece (in the Council of State’s DI.K.A.T.S.A. decision 1998 );  Spain (in the Tribunal Constitucional’s Maastricht-opinion of 1992 ) and, as a special case, France (in the Conseil d’Etat’s Cohn-Bendit decision of 1978 ). 
Jurisprudential developments that may turn into similar claims of the right to judicial review over European law can be detected in Belgium (in the Cour d’arbitrage’s-jurisprudence on treaty law ). Similar indications, which point at least to the remote possibility of courts claiming a reserve of power over European law, can be found in extrajudicial avenues in Sweden (in a statement from the highest court the constitutional amendments in the context of accession to the EU ) and in Austria (in the Official Government Statement on accession ). 
Other Member States have not fully developed a standard of national constitutional law control over European law, but such a possibility remains open. Portugal’s constitutional law includes limits on European integration. In addition, because of the supremacy of parliamentary decisions in Great Britain, the British constitutional reserve of power over European law - which exits in principle with the claim to have retained parliamentary sovereignty - is unlikely to be activated by the courts alone. 
Both the structural circumstances of the constitutional law and the general trend of the jurisprudence in regard to the European law-national law relationship make it highly improbable for a reserve of power to be claimed in Luxembourg (no possibility for national courts to control European law plus Community-friendly courts) and the Netherlands (no constitutional court, no judicial review of international agreements and unconditional precedence of international obligations, even over the constitution). For Finland, court-claims of reserve of power over European law are equally unlikely because of the constitutional order (no possibility for courts to review European law-compatibility with the constitution). 

In most Member States where a power to control European law is either being claimed or merely discussed, this power is justified on constitutional law grounds. In other words, in these Member States, the supremacy of European law over national law does not automatically extend to constitutional law. The Netherlands are a special case: there, not only do the Dutch courts lack the authority to judicially review European law, but there are no constitutional constraints on European law at all, as the Dutch constitutional order recognises without reservation the supremacy of Community law.
In contrast, German and Italian jurisprudence establishes a link between a national court’s finding an European act ultra vires and the violation of core constitutional law. In Germany, the argument centers on the German constitution’s principle of democracy,  while in Italy on the fundamental principals of the Italian constitution known as counterlimits or controlimiti. The jurisprudence of the Højesteret in Denmark points to a privileged position for constitutional provisions on liberties and on national independence.  
What appears to be particularly threatening for legal unity and the uniform interpretation of European law in the case-law of the highest courts and tribunals is the phenomenon of interpreting European law from the perspective of the national constitutional order, generating a parallel-version of European law (a constitutional law-version of European law). Such power to engage in an autonomous parallel-interpretation of European law compatible with the respective constitutions (thus doubling the standard of scrutiny) is claimed by the BVerfG in Germany (see supra ), the Corte Costituzionale in Italy (in the Frontini-case ); the Supreme Court in Ireland (inter alia in the Campus Oil decision ) and the Højesteret in Denmark (in the Maastricht decision Carlsen/Rasmussen ). 

All in all, considering the constitutional law framework and the case law of these courts, it seems fair to say that for some national supreme courts, developing a jurisprudence that would resemble the German Maastricht decision remains a possibility. The most important indications in that context are constitutional constraints imposed on the European law principle of supremacy by a given Member States’ constitutional order. 
Thus, one can say that there are certain tendencies in the jurisprudence of a number of Member States that are not entirely insignificant. These tendencies are marked by an emphasis on elements of the national constitutional order that are unalterable, thus ‘supremacy-proof’, and by the autonomous interpretation of European law by Member State courts that could lead to results that diverge from the ECJ’s findings (that is, parallel interpretation, 'constitutional law versions of European law'). In this respect, former German ECJ judge Ulrich Everling’s assessment of a ‘potential for conflict’  existing at the level of the Member States appears to be confirmed
cc) The highest courts in the new and prospective Member States
With the accession of at least 10 states from Central, Eastern and Southern Europe as of 2004, the role of their highest courts in relation to the ECJ comes into question.
In Poland, according to Art. 188 of the Polish constitution of 1997, it is the Constitutional Tribunal that decides inter alia on the compatibility of international treaties with the constitution, with the constitution taking precedence over international law obligations (Art. 90). In Hungary, the Constitutional Court has already made explicit reference to the German BVerfG’s Maastricht decision. As far as the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic is concerned, there are no indications yet of the position that court will take on the relationship between constitutional law and European law. 
The Supreme Court of Estonia’s case law on the association agreement with the EU indicates a willingness to bring the interpretation of the constitution and the duties flowing from European law into line. Latvia has had a Constitutional Court since 1996. The statute on Latvia’s international agreements of 1994 stipulates that international obligations take precedence over statutes, but not over the constitution. A similar statute (of 1999) and a Constitutional Court also exist in Lithuania. 
In Slovenia, the constitution also claims precedence over the international obligations. The Slovenian Constitutional Court has confirmed this in several decisions. As for Malta, the Maltese Constitutional Court seems to have concerns about the relationship with the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in Cyprus, international agreements take precedence over statutes but not over the constitution. 
In Slovakia , the constitutional amendment of February 2001 has introduced a specific, detailed provision dealing with European integration (Art. 7), which provides for the supremacy of European law over domestic statutes. It is unclear, though, whether the Slovak Constitutional Court would also extend this provision to constitutional law. In Bulgaria, the 1991 constitution attributes international agreements a rank superior to statutes, but inferior to the constitution, which would bind the Constitutional Court on this question. The situation appears to be similar in Romania and the Romanian Constitutional Court. 
Finally, in Turkey, it is expected that in the case of accession, the Turkish Constitutional Court would explicitly follow the way lead by the Solange I and II-jurisprudence of the BVerfG and the Frontini and Fragd decisions of the Italian Corte Costituzionale.

This summary overview indicates that almost all new Member States/candidates to accession have a constitutional court and that in a number of cases, unconditional supremacy of European law over the constitution is not compatible with the current constitution in these countries.  It must be noted, though, that the constitutional order is not yet consolidated in some of these states, as constitutional reforms and amendments are intended and pending. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say already that at least some of the highest courts and tribunals of these states may also be reluctant to unconditionally accept the ECJ’s claim to be the final arbiter on European law. 
3. Interim summary
One must not get carried away with the results of the analysis of the case law: after all, at this point, there is no open conflict in the relationship between the ECJ and the highest national courts.
Still, the lack of willingness to engage in a conversation with the ECJ by means of references under Art. 234 EC points to the potential for disobedience. It indicates to what extent national courts could be willing to insist on an original position vis-à-vis the ECJ. Here, the notorious courts are the German BVerfG, the Italian Corte Costituzionale and the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional. 
And without crossing the threshold to open conflict, there are still some worrying tendencies in the case law of the highest courts and tribunals of the Member States. These tendencies may be coined ‘frictional phenomena’.  They include the insistence on supremacy-proof elements of the national constitutional order (e.g. fundamental rights) and the autonomous interpretation of European law by Member State courts (in the context of competencies and ultra vires acts), which may lead to an interpretation distinct from the ECJ’s interpretation (a parallel interpretation, generating constitutional law versions of EU law). The relevant statements of the national courts are often made outside an actual legal question, as obiter dicta or in the context of a mere legal opinion. A plausible explanation for this is that the courts are emitting signals here that are also meant to be received by the ECJ, having an anticipatory effect on the ECJ. 
Another tendency that can be described is the seeming connection between specialised constitutional tribunals and the issue of a constitutional law reserve of power over European law (Germany, Italy, and Spain). On the other hand, the absence of a central constitutional court in the Member State acting as the guardian of its constitution or, at least, the core of its constitution, against European law appears advantageous for European law. Still, as the Danish example illustrates, this case does not exclude national claims to a final say over European law. 
The assessment of the situation in the new Member States and candidate States indicates that the emergence of frictional phenomena or even frictions between European law and the respective national constitutional orders remain a possibility there as well.
II. Adopting an analytical and a theoretical perspective
Although the frictional phenomena between the ECJ and the highest courts of the Member States detected in Part I have not so far crossed the threshold to open conflict, one may still reflect upon how to resolve the friction (see infra, 1) and how to put these frictional phenomena into a theoretical perspective (see infra, 2).
1. Dealing with the question of ultimate jurisdiction
One way to approach the potential for conflict inherent in the question of ultimate jurisdiction is to identify a set of legal tools or instruments which may help shape the legal context or the legal basis of the respective courts, with a view to clarifying the respective positions, in order to rationalise and in that sense resolve the conflict.

a) Modifying competence provisions and the standards applied
Differences of opinion between the European and the national legal orders on the location of the ultimate control competence on European law can be defused by modifying the attribution of competencies(in the  broadest sense) or standards applied by a court. The ‘Irish solution’ bears testimony to this. A primary law protocol annexed to the Maastricht treaty stipulates that nothing in the European treaties shall affect the application in Ireland of Art. 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland (prohibition of abortion). 
One has to differentiate between two aspects, though: Resolving an actual or potential conflict on the limits of very specific and concrete areas of European law may be possible by means of the ‘Irish solution’. But as far as the ‘ultimate umpire’ question is concerned, judicial conflict between courts can hardly be excluded by rewriting competence provisions alone, unless one doesn’t simply bar the ECJ from certain areas. The reason for this is the limited problem-solving capacity of written rules: a certain degree of leeway in respect of the interpretation of legal provisions is impossible to exclude. 
b) Modifying the institutions with ultimate jurisdiction and their legal environs
The most obvious solution to national courts’ claims of jurisdiction is to take away jurisdiction from these courts (aa) and to shift the responsibility for the type of ultimate decisions that are problematic in the present context to distinct institutions (bb). Structural safeguards of Member States’ interests and specific safeguards of Member State courts may play an indirect role in setting a threshold for national courts’ claims of ultimate jurisdiction in questions of European law (cc). Finally, re-conceptualising supremacy may help (dd).
aa) Jurisdiction
It would be a radical measure, but it could be effective: Why not explicitly forbid national courts to take any kind of decision on European law? Depending on the structures of the various national legal orders, this could be achieved by a simple statute or an amendment to the constitution. Whenever courts such as the BVerfG exercise their ultimate jurisdiction on (national) constitutional law or claim to be reviewing national law only (the German act of assent, for example), a prohibition on controlling European law would be insufficient, though. What would be necessary here, would be an explicit statement inscribed into national law that even incidental questions of European law must be resolved under Art. 234 EC and not answered by national courts. This would amount to a reinforcement of obligations already existing under European law.
bb) Institutional solutions
Institutional solutions are particularly noteworthy in relation to competence conflicts in the strict sense – the overstepping of competence boundaries which delimit specific areas (ultra vires acts). They may be conceptualised as judicial (1) or a political (2) mode of control. 
(1) Judicial control: Courts of Competence
The establishment of special courts for resolving competence conflicts is something that was suggested early on in the history of the US federal system, but without success.  Comparable proposals have repeatedly been made for the EU, in recent times even by acting judges of the German BVerfG (the proposal of a special Treaty Arbitration Court composed out of 15 representatives of national courts and one ECJ representative, and of a ‘Common Constitutional Court’ bringing together members of ‘the Member State constitutional courts’). Other proposals in this context include suggestions to establish a European Supreme Court (Europäischer Oberster Gerichtshof) or a European Constitutional Tribunal (Europäisches Verfassungsgericht), a Union Court of Review, a Constitutional Council, or a European Conflicts Tribunal. 
(2) Political control
The responsibility for the political control of competencies could be assigned to existing institutions such as the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, or to institutions that would have to be newly created, such as a special parliamentary committee. But one may also develop further the idea of ‘soft’ political solutions, which could offer procedures not focusing so much on actual conflict resolution, but rather emphasising the importance of conflict avoidance by means of procedures and deliberation (reports, Ombudsman-procedures). 
(3) Political sensitivity in matters of competencies
Without entering into a detailed appraisal of the proposals, it seems fair to say that new institutions would have only a limited problem-solving capacity. First, it cannot be emphasised enough that there is a court of competence already - the ECJ. ECJ judge Colneric has presented a detailed account of the jurisprudence of the court in the field of competencies. Introducing an additional court with comprehensive powers would amount to a complete reshuffle of the institutional setting at the European level. As to the suggested ex ante control of competencies, they would fail to catch ECJ decisions. Moreover, an institution composed of European members and national members on an equal basis would probably be unable to solve or prevent conflicts. In sum: So new institutions would not prove effective in resolving all possible conflict scenarios. 
It seems to me that the crux of the competence issue in non-unitary systems is to ensure that all actors exercise a consistently high level of sensitivity in matters of competencies. This can be achieved neither by the wording of competence provisions, however detailed they are, nor by institutional arrangements alone. This points again to the importance of ‘soft’ mechanisms (procedures, reports etc.) which aim at a structurally different and cautious approach towards competencies. 
Nonetheless a conceivable institution would be an additional forum for judicial dialogue  between courts of the different levels, but without the authority to take binding decisions. It would be composed of ECJ judges and the highest-ranking national judges and could perhaps (also) deal with competence issues, without being an additional court taking binding decisions. In the past, judicial dialogue, the continuous conversation between the courts of the different levels by means of the Art. 234 EC-procedure, has proven to be a fundamental element of the constitutionalisation of the Community legal order driven forward by the ECJ. This is why dialogue, discourse and conversation between the courts seem to bear a substantive problem-solving potential for the future as well. In this sense, establishing a ‘Joint Senate of the highest courts and tribunals of the European Union’ may be a good idea.
cc) Political safeguards of federalism and judicial federalism
There are two approaches that have been developed in the US in order to  elucidate the relationship between federal level and state level, which may aid a better understanding of the EU.
The theory of Political Safeguards of Federalism  emphasises the safeguards of state-interests by means of structural characteristics of the overarching (federal) level, which in turn allows courts to exercise self-restraint. It has been noted by Koen Lenaerts that this approach actually suits the EC/EU constellation even better than the US situation. The problem in the present context is, that in order to justify judicial self-restraint of Member State courts, it is the Member State courts themselves that have to be convinced that structural safeguards of Member State interests are adequate at the European level. Decisions such as the German BVerfG’s Maastricht judgment however, demonstrate that such conviction is by no means forthcoming.
The basic concept behind judicial federalism in the US  is the guarantee of autonomous and comprehensive powers for the state courts in a multilevel system. Some of the doctrines and mechanisms developed in the US in that context  may be of some interest for the EU. A procedure similar to the Certification procedure  (whereby Federal courts submit references to State courts on questions of State law) could, for example, be helpful in all cases where provisions at the European level (e.g. Art. 6(3) EU, see infra, dd)) can be interpreted as referring to national law. Such a procedure would also emphasise the autonomy of Member State courts and counteract the impression of there being a hierarchy between the courts of the different levels. 
dd) Supremacy
Unconditionally to accept supremacy of European law over any national law has been equated to the creation of Federal statehood at the EU level. The term that is used in the Swedish debate for the unconditional acceptance of supremacy, prostration, is even more graphic, as it symbolises the utmost kind of humble subordination. The surrender of possibilities of using constitutional law to fend off the supremacy claim of European law is viewed as subordination under a ‘foreign’ power. Note, though, that such subordination is not a merely theoretical idea, but, in the case of the Netherlands for example, part of the constitutional law of the land. 
The Irish solution of a protocol at the level of European primary law to preserve the sacrosanctity of national constitutional provisions on abortion could be regarded as simply being peculiar to the specific anti-abortion provision of the Irish constitution (see supra). But it may be read more broadly as a revocation of European law’s claim to supremacy in respect of specific Member State interests, which are of particular importance in a given case.
Consideration for Member State matters is not such an unusual concept. Indeed it may be found in the original treaties. Examples include the public service (Art. 39(4) EC) and official authority exceptions (Art. 45 EC) and the exceptions from the fundamental freedoms in Arts. 30, 46 and 55 EC, all of those exceptions being uniform concepts of Community law. It is also conceivable then that a common set of fundamentals of national constitutional law could be established, which could be declared exempt from the supremacy of European law. 

Art. 6(3) EU goes beyond mere Community-wide exceptions to European law. According to this provision, the European Union shall respect the national identities of the Member States. Here, a uniform European concept of national identities would be meaningless. This provision clearly refers back to the Member States. As national identity arguably includes constitutional identity, Art. 6(3) EU could be seen as a European level starting point to revoke the claim of supremacy of European law over the Member States’ constitutional identity. Art. 6(3) EU is complemented by the principle laid down in Art. 10 EC, which has been considered the basis for the Community’s duty to respect national constitutional structures. In the German debate, the principle in Art. 10 EC is typically referred to as Community comity (Gemeinschaftstreue), a concept reminiscent of federal comity (Bundestreue).
Apart from the fact that, according to Art. 46 EU, the jurisdiction of the ECJ does not include Art. 6(3), one may ask how the concept of national identity can be given meaning from the European level. One answer could be to include  the Member States into the process of clarification of that concept: It is hardly surprising that it is an Irish academic contribution that develops the idea of protection of national fundamental (constitutional) choices, inherent to Art. 6(3) EU, further into attributing to national courts of last instance the role of determining the content of national fundamental choices, as recognised and protected by European law. This is where a European version of the American Certification procedure (see supra) could be helpful.  
The core idea of European level considerations for constitutional principles of the Member States can also be detached from Art. 6(3) EU: one proposal suggests a duty for the Community, in conjunction with Art. 10 EC, to consider and respect national constitutional structures when exercising European competencies. 

All in all, it can be said that there are various options of how to find distinct and comprehensive answers to the open question of the ambit of the supremacy principle. The options range from an unconditional acceptance of the supremacy of the law of the overarching level (the European level) by the Member States to more complex solutions, such as European law safeguards of specific fundamental Member State choices. 
ee) A variety of legal tools and instruments
There is indeed a set of tools and instruments which could be used in order to minimise the friction between highest national courts and the ECJ. Firstly, a modification of the law is a possibility, with a view to clarifying the scope of the supremacy principle, particularly in relation to the national constitutions. Other, complementary legal options include adopting a type of judicial federalism and relying on the courts’ self-restraint on the condition of political-structural safeguards of Member State interests. One may also consider institutional solutions with a view to the creation of juridical or political institutions that bring together the European and the Member State levels, or solving selected conflicts by modifying the allocation of competencies. 
2. Adopting a theoretical perspective
a) Existing approaches
One way to approach differences between national courts and the ECJ is to reject either one or the other position by legal arguments. This approach was adopted, for example, by commentators on the Maastricht decision, in that they repeatedly attempted to prove either the BVerfG or the ECJ ‘wrong’ with arguments based in constitutional law, European law, and occasionally in public international law. The efficacy of this kind of approach is rather limited, as the indications are that neither national courts, such as the BVerfG, nor the ECJ are willing to surrender ground to the respective counter-position.

A position seemingly inspired by this view touches upon the limits of legal reasoning. It considers this type of conflict unresolvable on a legal level, as both the ECJ and the BVerfG argue consistently from their respective positions. In terms of legal theory, this can be conceptualised as a conflict of Grundnorms in the Kelsenian sense, for which no further legal solution is available. This position is of particular significance, as it constitutes a fundamental objection to any attempt to go beyond the evaluation of the respective positions of the courts. If there is no ‘legal’ authority in sight that could solve the conflicting positions of the courts, the dispute about who is the final arbiter on European law is probably simply not a legal problem in the conventional sense. Instead, the ECJ and the highest national courts and tribunals could be considered Grenzorgane, or borderline institutions in the Verdrossian sense: that is, institutions bound by the law, but not subject to any legal control, so that the resolution of a conflict is a merely political or sociological matter, at the end of the day a ‘question of power’. This is also the core of the argument of those who propose leaving the ‘ultimate umpire’ question open and unresolved. 
The attraction of these latter approaches is without any doubt their level-headed pragmatism. It is likely that these approaches are inspired by some kind of calm confidence that the friction between the courts will not escalate into open conflict. And it cannot be denied that the frictions between the courts are easier to overlook than open conflicts.  
What remains a problem, though, is that these approaches - in particular when referring to a conflict of Grundnorms - are probably too hastily giving up on finding a slightly less grand legal reasoning, thus not contributing to what law, and constitutional law in particular, is all about: legal certainty and the legal constraining of power. And there is also some evidence that the national courts’ positions have already caused some harm in terms of legal certainty already. In Germany, some judges of lower courts can give a detailed account of how the BVerfG’s concept of ultra vires acts did induce law-suits against European acts in national courts.

Finally, the German BVerfG, in its case law, invents the term  Kooperationsverhältnis (‘relationship of cooperation’) to describe the relationship  between the ECJ and the highest national courts of Member States. One should note, though, that the BVerfG refers to the relationship of cooperation in the Maastricht decision only in the context of the protection of fundamental rights. This brings me back to the difference between the two categories ‘ultra vires acts’ and ‘acts violating fundamental rights as accorded by the German constitution’ (see supra). Academic writings before the Maastricht decision also suggested cooperation between BVerfG and ECJ in the context of fundamental rights only, and not for ultra vires acts. The BVerfG has used this concept of a relationship of cooperation since the Maastricht decision as well. Nevertheless, the nature and scope of this concept remain ill-defined and require further clarification. 
b) Embedding the problem into a modern concept of constitutionalism
As was explained earlier, possibilities for dealing with the differences between the courts by shaping the legal environment do exist. Art. 35 EU and 68 EC, for example, suggest the possibility for the Member States to ‘clip the ECJ’s wings’. The fact that the possibilities are not followed through may indicate that the problem simply is not serious enough or not taken seriously enough to change the law. Another explanation is that national governments simply do not understand the problem. Or it may be because the conflict between the courts itself has a special role to play in the relationship between EU and Member States - that of indirectly safeguarding Member State interests. On that reading, the claims of Member State courts of ultimate jurisdiction allow Member States to circumvent European law obligations that are not in line with their interests. Leaving the question of ultimate jurisdiction open thus appears to be in the interest of Member States: reserving the right of Member State courts to claim ultimate jurisdiction could be considered a kind of compensation for the ever-decreasing influence of Member States on decision-making at the European level. Thus, national court claims of ultimate jurisdiction may even bear some stabilising potential, as they may well lead to minority opinions among Member States, e.g. in a vote, to be taken into consideration at the European level, contributing to maintaining the balance between the two levels. 
The challenge for European constitutional legal science is to capture phenomena of European constitutional reality within a modern concept of constitutionalism. Friction between courts and the function of this friction are a part of this European constitutional reality 
aa) Clarification: What constitution? Constitutions, Verfassungsverbund and multilevel constitutionalism
(1) Constitutions and the concept of Verfassungsverbund
Whether it is accurate or desirable to speak of the existence of a European Constitution today is subject to debate, to say the least.  The critics do not only query the de-coupling of the concept of constitution from the concept of ‘state’. They also point to the risk of weakening the national constitution, inherent in the idea of a European Constitution, since the structural security built into national constitutions is called into question. And, the argument continues, a constitution is the enactment of an existing legal culture, which must be developed to some degree, and this level of development has not yet been achieved as regards in the EU. Such an emphatic approach to the concept of constitution may have numerous advantages, not least the familiarity of the interpreters of the constitution with this concept. 
In consideration of the developments at the suprastatal level throughout the second half of the 20th century, a different strand of constitutional thought has called for a ‘rethinking of the concept of constitution’. It seems to me that under the changed circumstances of a ‘post-national constellation’ (Jürgen Habermas, Michael Zürn), a more pragmatic concept of constitutionalism, emphasising that there is no state or public power beyond that established by the constitution, is probably more helpful in explaining the phenomena relating to European integration. 
As far as the European Union is concerned, there are two observations that seem to be relevant in the present context: First, there already exists in the EU, European public authority or public power, which affects the individual directly in his or her legal status. Second, at least the German constitution points beyond itself by referring to the objective of a unified Europe (”zur Verwirklichung eines vereinten Europas”) in the preamble and in Art. 23(1). With this in mind, we may answer the question of whether there is a constitutional dimension to European integration in the affirmative. One  possible conceptualisation of this constitutional dimension is to depict ‘the’ European constitution as a complementary structure of national and European constitutions. This concept is known as Verfassungsverbund (multilevel constitutionalism). The closest literal translation of this term is compound of constitutions. According to this concept, a European constitution does exist already, and arises out of both national and European constitutional levels. European and national constitutional law form two levels of a unitary system in terms of substance, function and institutions. On this reading, the principle of supremacy in application (Anwendungsvorrang) does not imply a hierarchy of norms in the sense of the hierarchical superiority or inferiority of either European or national (constitutional) law: ‘The hallmark of the Verfassungsverbund is its non-hierarchic structure’. This distinction between supremacy and hierarchy may not of itself be entirely convincing. But one can identify a deeper basis of validity for the European compound constitution, which is the individual, to whom the public powers allocated to the national and European component constitutions may be traced back. This is also where a more convincing justification of the concept of supremacy may be found. 
 (2) Multilevel systems
Josef Isensee’s comment that the EU/EC is slipping away from established, traditional typologies of public international and constitutional law  illustrates why one may have to try and go beyond the traditional typologies in an even more principled way, and establish new concepts such as ‘multilevel systems’.
 
(a) Objections to the traditional repertoire of terms and concepts
The objections raised against the ‘traditional repertoire of terms and concepts’  may be briefly clarified by means of the example of those terms and concepts typically used to describe non-unitary systems within which there are competing public powers. In a nutshell, Staat and Staatlichkeit (statehood) have been coined the “central complex of German constitutional psychology” from an outside observer’s perspective. Federal state (Bundesstaat) and federal statehood (Bundesstaatlichkeit) are established terms used since the call for a European federal state in the early days of European integration. Hugo Preuss considered the elimination of the term ‘sovereignty’ from constitutional theory to be a precondition of any kind of development of a modern constitutional theory at the end of the 19th century - already more than 100 years ago. Concepts such as ‘autonomous legal order’ or ‘independent legal system’ will always lead back to equally unclear concepts such as ‘independent source of effectiveness’ of a legal order. ‘Federalism’ encounters the difficulty of finding some common understanding of this term and concept from the outset. Then there is the term ‘constitution’.  Any attempt to establish a substantive understanding of this term for non-statal entities meets with resistance  and brings about a debate not only on the link between statehood and constitution (see supra), but also on the basis of a legal order, the exact location of sovereignty, the core of federalism etc. Accordingly, even the concept of Verfassungsverbund (multilevel constitutionalism),  which seeks to avoid the trappings of traditional terms and concepts, encounters objections that point to the danger of blurring responsibilities, of falling into joint-decision traps, of the ‘federal-state-kind-of-thought dependency of compound constructions’, and of potential ‘blueprint traps’.
What is interesting is that the quest for neutral analytical concepts to elucidate new and recent phenomena  is also taking place in the realm of social science, with – in part – the same motivation as in law, namely to overcome the fixation with the state as the dominant form of political organisation. Under the label of 'New Institutionalism', there have been attempts to overcome the state-orientation of social science in general and of International Relations theory in particular, starting out from a broad concept of institutions, which includes formal and informal institutions as well as procedures.
Moreover, what speaks in favour of trying to develop a more neutral concept such as that of a ‘multilevel system’ is the very nature of the subject of scrutiny already: the particular conceptual form and shape of the EC/EU, which is open and must remain so. There are indications that the ‘traditional repertoire of terms and concepts’ will be incapable of adequately explaining the specifics of this original ‘organisational reality’ of the EC/EU, if, as is arguably the case for the EC/EU, this reality is a dynamic, ongoing process. This is because traditional and less traditional (Staatenverbund ) terms and concepts tend to be geared to static phenomena, already presupposing a political unit and unity. The EU/EC as a ‘fluid system’ may ‘hardly be described and circumscribed with rigid terms and notions’. This also applies to another concept, developed out of a perceived inadequacy of existing concepts  in the early days of European integration. It was first used by social scientists, and was later taken on and developed further by lawyers:  the concept of supranationalism  or of a supranational Union. Even if this term does manage to grasp the nature of the EU/EC, it still tends to be oriented towards a concept of a static, already established entity.
The fact that there is ‘still no convincing concept’ for the Community as a ‘novum’ and, arguably, an ‘interim form’, may be another argument related to European integration in favour of a concept more neutral than the traditional, established terms and concepts of existing constitutional thought.   
It seems to me that, very similar to the approach followed in social sciences, it is advisable to search for concepts, which are as neutral as possible, decoupled from the traditional terms and concepts, and which make it possible to leave aside concepts and terms that are not relevant for a given question.
Finally, the comparative law context which is inherent in European integration also speaks in favour of referring to an analytical concept such as that of a ‘multilevel system’, which is as neutral as can be. The variety of legal and constitutional concepts in Europe arising out of differences in language and legal culture (as may easily be illustrated by the different understandings of state, federalism, sovereignty and constitution), necessitates an enormous amount of conceptual and terminological clarification, before one uses these terms and notions in the EU context. 
The mere translation of new terms and concepts such as Staatenverbund or Verfassungsverbund for example into English already proves highly problematic: Whereas multilevel constitutionalism  transports at least the idea behind the concept; the English translation of Staatenverbund (compound of states)  remains clumsy. Nuances between Verbund (compound) and Verband (association) pale into obscurity.

 (b) The level metaphor
Irrespective of the question of what exactly defines a multilevel system, one may already have doubts about whether the particular metaphor of distinct levels depicts the reality of non-unitary systems better than others. Beyond the specific use in the context of the social science-multilevel system, the metaphor of ‘levels’ can typically be found in theories of federalism and in social science descriptions of European integration. In the field of law in Germany, Gunnar Folke Schuppert, Rainer Wahl and Udo Di Fabio have adopted the multilevel metaphor. There may be a problem with the image of different levels, used to describe non-unitary systems, though, as the term ‘level’ suggests a super-/subordination and an impermeable separation of the levels. The latter at least does not really correspond to the decision-making structure of the EU/EC, where, for example, the Council of Ministers is made up of members of the ‘other level’ and where joint-decision trap-phenomena  have reached a European dimension. 
Other common attempts to describe non-unitary systems include the centre-periphery model, the pyramid model and the matrix model, or the attempt to overcome the whole/components distinction by terming the Union and the Member States ‘centres’ in the sense of a ‘polycentric system’. In the context of federal theory, the orthodox ‘layer model’ has been complemented by a ‘marble cake model’, where ingredients – meaning component entities - are less easy to distinguish. 
Compared to all these other models, the advantage of the ‘level’ metaphor seems to be that it captures the horizontal juxtaposition of constituent entities better than, for example, the polycentric structure. Horizontal coupling is typical of complex social systems: Renate Mayntz refers to the work of American organisational theory scholar and Nobel-prize winner Herbert A. Simon in that field, who showed that this kind of structure to a structure principle typical of organic life forms that has been successful in evolution because of its effectiveness.
The objection of joint-decision trap phenomena can be rebutted in that even joint-decision traps and respective theories presuppose distinct and determinable units, that develop into situations of joint-decision traps later on. It is in the sense of describing distinct and determinable units that ‘levels’ are to be understood in the present context.
Furthermore, the image of distinct levels is not necessary linked to super- and subordination. Levels may also be understood as platforms that may be at equal height in one case, at different heights in another, or even circling freely around each other.

(c) Multilevel systems - attempting a definition
Disregarding the traditional terms and concepts when examining a specific problem only makes sense, though, if a conceptual alternative succeeds. 
There are two empirical observations independent of concepts of constitution, state or federalism that appear to be beyond contestment: Existing political entities are typically sub-divided into component units for reasons of practicability. Or existing political units unite to form a new political entity, without giving up their own quality as – now constituent – distinct, individual units. A sharing out of tasks between constituted or original overarching entities and their component sub-entities is agreed upon, which finds its legal expression in an allocation of powers or competencies between the overarching unit and the sub-units. 
Typically, there will be an overarching entity with a certain range of competencies on one level and a multitude of entities each with an equally large range of competencies - not, however, necessarily the same competencies - on another level. The term ‘overarching’ is simply used to denote the relation of levels and entities towards each other. It is by no means used to suggest hierarchical superiority. A (decision-making) level is characterised by one or more (decision-making) entities with equal or similar competencies. An entity may well be an overarching one, that covers several entities in the way described supra, and itself be a component entity of another overarching entity. Thus, in principle, multilevel systems may cover a multitude of levels. The entities in that context are political units with an original or attributed decision-making power and a certain degree of legal-organisational distinctiveness that makes them distinguishable in the first place. 
Public power is thus not defined by the monopoly of power, the traditional concept used inter alia to define elements of sovereignty, rather by the mere decision-making power (leaving aside the question of enforcement capacity), typically expressed in the concrete form of norm- or law-making capacities. The decision-making power represents a subset of the elements that characterise the traditional concept of state and public power: the monopoly of force plus exclusive law-making powers. The legal powers defined as competencies take on a concrete form through a decision. Levels in the context of a legal multilevel system are decision-making levels. 
Decision in this context is a cipher for decision-making operating under the rule of law, i.e. determined by and organised according to law. The emphasis on the element of decision instead of that of enforcement when defining public power may also be found elsewhere: The element of decision is the object and central paradigm of  regime theory in social sciences, though under the distinct label of ”governance”. Whether one categorises entities with a relatively small norm- or law-making capacity, such as municipalities in Germany or French regions, as levels depends on how strictly one wishes the criteria of decision-making powers to be. 

A series of levels representing a multilevel system  is distinguishable from the many other existing levels and entities by virtue of the factual and legal relationship between them. First, there is a specific factual relationship between the different levels of a multilevel system: Typically, a multilevel system will have one overarching unit on one side and a multitude of smaller entities on another level, the latter entities being a subset of the overarching unit in terms of territory and individuals. In addition to this factual relationship, there will typically be a specific legal bond among the entities and levels, which rests upon the factual link: The law of the distinct levels claims to be effective within the same territory – in principle, the individual may be granted rights and receive obligations from each of the levels. 
Legal acts of the different levels can thus cover identical or similar situations.  
bb) The role of courts in a multilevel system 
(1) From constitutional court to complementary constitutional adjudication?
If the European constitution can be conceptualised as a complementary structure in the sense of multilevel constitutionalism (Verfassungsverbund), European constitutional adjudication may have to be conceptualised in a similar way. On a positive reading, ‘the’ European constitutional court would consist of both the highest national courts and tribunals and the ECJ. Since, from the theoretical perspective of multilevel constitutionalism, the national courts’ and the ECJ’s authority both stem from the individual, there is no presupposed hierarchy between the courts, rather a duty of cooperation. The task of this composite European constitutional court would be that of a guardian and interpreter of the (composite) European constitution. This concept of ‘the European constitutional court’ clearly differs from the ideal that Walter Hallstein and others seemed to have in mind when they modelled the ECJ on the US Supreme Court.
 (2) Courts in a multilevel system
Having chosen a neutral analytical concept, the multilevel system, and having merely observed that there is friction between the highest national courts and the ECJ, the fundamental consideration must be how to minimise the potential for conflict in the event of diverging claims of ultimate jurisdiction in multilevel systems.
Empirical analysis indicates that at the end of the day, the subject of conflict in the relationship between the levels are the issue of supremacy and the question of the source of European law, its basis of validity. The latter question is controversial in the context of the concept of compound or multilevel constitutionalism (the Verfassungsverbund), since the mere concept of constitutionalism implies a statement on the source of European law. This question can be left open in the multilevel context. 
As far as the supremacy issue is concerned, the multilevel description exposes the basic requirements for a conditional principle of supremacy between distinct levels of public powers to function: The supremacy question, at the end of the day, can be answered unambiguously only according to the content accorded to it at the overarching level. In the EU, this content is the principle of precedence in application (Anwendungsvorrang), though not in validity (Geltungsvorrang), of the law of the overarching level. In order to avoid conflicts, though, any claims for elements of national law, in particular constitutions, to be exempt from the supremacy of European law  have to be recognised by both levels in principle, and determined consensually from both levels, in concrete cases. 
This brings me to the core question of where to locate ultimate jurisdiction claims of the highest national courts and tribunals at the European level. The answer points to Art. 234 EC in a procedural perspective and to Art. 6(3) EU in a substantive perspective. The interpretation of the latter norm has to be accomplished by both the highest national courts and the ECJ. The fundamental rights saga from Solange I up to the Banana decisions in front of the ECJ and the BVerfG seem to indicate that the respective courts of ultimate decision, guardians of the interests of the respective levels, are already working towards establishing a core of (constitutional) law exempt from the supremacy of European law, and accepted as such from both levels. 
c) Objections to complementary European constitutional adjudication 
Whether one starts out from multilevel constitutionalism or merely from a multilevel description of legal systems, the idea of a complementary structure of European constitutional adjudication raises numerous objections.
aa) Asymmetry
The heterogeneity of the highest national courts and tribunals was described earlier. This heterogeneity is not limited to the role of the judge, the language of the decisions and the acceptance of judge-made law in the different Member States. There are also differences in the range of powers and jurisdiction of the highest national courts. Hence the concept of a complementary European constitutional judiciary leads to a very different shape of European constitutional law adjudication from Member State to Member State. 
In Germany, for example, the strong constitutional court may claim exemption from European supremacy for certain national constitutional law principles, whereas in the Netherlands, for lack of a constitutional court, this possibility does not exist.
One the one hand, this kind of asymmetry is intrinsic to the heterogeneity of the EU Member States, which is one of the crucial constitutional hallmarks of the Union. On the other hand, proposals in some of the Member States for court reforms, going as far as the introduction of genuine constitutional courts may be part of some trend towards convergence,  promoted to some extent by the ultimate jurisdiction issue. This is indicated by the Swedish example, at least. In any case, the new Member States and the candidates for accession to the EU have almost all established a constitutional court (see supra). This may lead to an overall strengthening of influence of the courts in the EU.
Generally speaking, this is the point where the merits of a multilevel description become apparent: The relevant borderline between public powers in the EU is the line between the European and the Member State levels. The way the fundamental rights issue developed is a good illustration that it may well be enough to have one single court of one level – in that case the German BVerfG - determining the interests of that level. This is not to say that the German BVerfG may be some kind of role model for other courts in other Member States. It is simply to say that the reservations expressed by the BVerfG in the field of fundamental rights  have contributed to making the case law of the ECJ clearer in this area. All Member States have benefitted from this, whether or not they have a constitutional court who voiced similar national concerns to the BVerfG. In that sense, the BVerfG could be seen as not only the guardian of the German constitution, but also a guardian of the interests of the Member State level generally. The same applies, of course, for the other highest national courts and tribunals in their respective positioning towards the ECJ.

The objection that the ECJ and the highest national courts are not really comparable – in spite of occasional descriptions of the ECJ as a constitutional court  – carries particular weight. It possibly points to an asymmetry between the courts in question, which excludes any concept of a system of complementary jurisdiction in respect of European constitutional law. On that reading, the ECJ and the highest national courts and tribunals are just too different. 
One fundamental difference, addressed earlier, is the absence of a ‘real’ constitution. If constitutional adjudication can indeed be said to be characterised by a particularly large margin of interpretation, constitutional adjudication without a constitution could admittedly prove to be rather problematic. I will not undertake a more detailed analysis of this problem at this juncture. 
Another difference is, for example, that it is the exception that individuals appear in front of the ECJ. In European procedural law, the Member States, the Commission and national courts (by way of references) are privileged parties. These are the ECJ’s preferred interlocutors. The ECJ has confirmed this in its recent case law, against the Court of First Instance and against the advice of the Advocate General. This seems to point to a conception of the ECJ’s function as relating specifically to maintaining and strengthening European integration, rather than being concerned with the individual’s legal protection. The debate about the introduction of some form of fundamental rights complaint, modelled more or less on the German Verfassungsbeschwerde, may indicate a change of perceptions if not a shift of paradigms, though. This may well further raise the perception or even the role of the ECJ as the court of the Union citizen, with all the consequences that such a shift of paradigms would bring about. 
Other differences between national courts and the ECJ may be related to the fact that traditional concepts of separation of powers cannot simply be transferred to the European construct: On that reading, the European judiciary may have a totally different role, compared to that of a supreme national court.

The most serious objection in the present context is probably the one that points to the differences in democratic legitimacy between the ECJ on the one hand and the highest national courts and tribunals on the other. Unlike the courts of many Member States, who take their decisions ‘in the name of the people’, the ECJ does not even reveal in whose name or on whose behalf it is speaking. This raises the question of who or what legitimises the ECJ. According to Art. 223 EC, the European judges are appointed by the governments of the Member States without any parliamentary participation - neither of the European, nor of national parliaments. In contrast, the judges of the German BVerfG, for example, are elected by parliament (Art. 94 of the German constitution). It is nevertheless true that the selection of ECJ judges can be democratically justified by chains of legitimacy, some of which are longer than others. However, it should be noted that European law does not prevent parliamentary participation at the Member State level, as the Austrian example of parliamentary participation proves. Generally speaking, one will find numerous unanswered fundamental questions on the legitimacy of judges at the Member State level as well, and the German procedure of selecting the highest judges by parliament could itself be criticised for not being as transparent as, say, the US solution of public hearings of the prospective judges 
At the end of the day, the utterly different understandings of and approaches to the nature and the range of democratic legitimacy of courts is probably simply the corollary of the heterogeneity of the Member States.
bb) The evaporation of responsibilities - Who is to define the common good?
There are more fundamental objections than asymmetry to a concept of complementary jurisdiction in European constitutional law. They concern the issue of accountability and the question of how to establish a concept of ‘common good’ in such a complex system.  
Just as a certain fuzziness or lack of clarity has developed over time in the realm of the executive, between Council, national governments and administrative structures, a composite structure of jurisdiction might be vulnerable to an unclear and ill-defined division of responsibilities and jurisdiction. There is a danger that this could lead to a vacuum of responsibility for fundamental rights protection in concreto, as the Banana cases indicated. There, the principles where upheld, but the Banana importers went bankrupt. It would be a serious problem indeed if a forum for the definition of the common good, the place where a concept of solidarity could also be developed, became less and less discernible. In this instance, solidarity-free individualisation would then have also reached the realm of constitutional law. 
cc) Is there any value in theories of composite structures of adjudication?
The value of conceptualising what the courts in the EU do or should do by means of a non-hierarchic, composite multilevel structure may be summarised as follows: Starting out from a concept that covers the national and the European levels, and thus establishing responsibilities of adjudication on European constitutional law for both of them, the non-hierarchic relationship of the courts begins to take on a clearer form, constitutional clarity is enhanced and a reciprocal strengthening of constitutional bonds and limits is achieved.
The multilevel approach can serve as a starting point to develop criteria for determining the limits of responsibilities and as a conceptual basis for the constitutional dialogue between the courts, which are allotted functions according to a specific concept of constitutionalism. That means rejecting the conflict paradigm and more readily accepting the cooperation paradigm. To some extent, the non-subordination of national courts could be explained and legitimised in terms of European constitutional law. It would no longer automatically be seen as an infringement of European law. In any case, there would be clear limits on how national courts may act, which would remove the foundations of misleading legal reasoning (particularly in respect of ultra vires acts ). 
3. Interim summary
 The ‘frictional phenomena’ that exist between the highest national courts and tribunals of the Member States and the ECJ can be legally analysed and their specific manifestations affected by law. They have a function in the relationship between EU and Member States. There are theoretical tools which can help constructively to explain and conceptualise this function and the empirical findings of differences between the courts. By means of concepts such as the Verfassungsverbund or the multilevel system, the cooperation paradigm can be emphasised. 
III. Prospective developments in the relationship between European and national courts
The Declaration on the future of the Union annexed to the Treaty of Nice, the Laeken declaration, the summoning of a Convention for 2002/2003 in order to prepare an Intergovernmental Conference in 2003/2004 and the accession of ten and more states from Central and Eastern Europe concern fundamental questions of European law that do not leave the courts unaffected. 
1. Topics of the constitutional debate until 2004
a) Fundamental rights
One of the questions with which the Convention  is supposed to deal is the question of the binding character of the Fundamental Rights Charter. Especially if coupled with some new kind of procedural device such as a ‘constitutional complaint’ for individuals to the ECJ or a substantial modification of Art. 230 para. 4 EC, the consequence could be a fundamental shift of paradigms, away from the market-driven economic community towards a fundamental rights community. This raises the question of the ECJ’s future role in that context, and thus, indirectly the question of the role of national courts. Problems may arise out of the fact that a genuine codification of European fundamental rights may make more apparent the divergence in control, scrutiny and standards of protection between the European level and at least some of the Member States. Some observers expect to see a shift in the responsibility for protecting fundamental rights from the political sphere to the judiciary despite the merely political nature of the Fundamental Rights Charter. In this event, the judiciary would again ‘be forced to be the driving force behind European integration’ (Paul Kirchhof). It may be that if this happened, the ECJ would be somewhat overtaxed.
b) The delimitation of powers and competencies
According to the ‘Declaration on the future of the Union’ annexed to the Treaty of Nice, one point for discussion before a 2004 Intergovernmental Conference is ”inter alia” the question of ”how to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of powers between the European Union and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity”.
In fact, the competence issue is not that much a question of the wording of general competence provisions, rather of who decides in cases of concrete conflict. A genuine additional Court of competence court was among the proposals. There is no urgent need to establish such an additional court, though, and experience indicates that the inertia of a status quo would be a significant obstacle to establishing such a new institution. But the entire debate about competencies and the recurring accusation that the ECJ is not fulfilling its functions, threatens to weaken the position of the ECJ, with destabilising side-effects for the entire system of European constitutional law adjudication.
c) The debate on the shape of the European executive power
The effects of the debate on European governance and on the European executive power on the ECJ remain unclear. The debate initiated by the Commission in order to improve governance in Europe  fails to take into account the role and functions of the ECJ. The entire approach has an executive-driven tendency (reliance on experts, independent agencies), but it is hard to tell how this may affect the role of the courts. There is a possibility that expansion of executive leeway outside of judicial review at the European level may weaken the position of courts in the EU in general. This point is illustrated by the European Council, an institution acting completely outside the scope of judicial review (Art. 46 EU).
More generally, the debate on the future shape of the European executive and particularly the choice between an elected President of the Commission and an elected President of the EU attached to the Council, may also affect the courts. Although the courts are not the primary subject of this debate as they hardly play a role in the institutional debate at all, the fact that in the future a more politicised Commission or, worse, a Commission more or less deprived of power, may no longer act as guardian of the treaties, could have an indirect effect on the Court, increasing its burden of responsibility to defend the supranational originality and independence of the entire integration project. The dichotomy of legislature and executive might be taken to imply that the separation of powers concept of the nation state can simply be applied to the EU. This is not necessarily the case.
The judiciary may be the last remaining institution to be implementing the driving idea behind European integration of the last 50 years which was to mediate political conflict by means of law, and its an (assumed) rationality. 
d) Extending majority voting
The extension of (qualified) majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers is often considered to be the key to securing the functioning of an enlarged Union. In the development of European integration from the Single European Act 1986, to the Treaty of Maastricht 1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 and most recently the Treaty of Nice 2000, very little substantial progress has been made in this subject 
Extending majority voting could have an effect on the role of national courts. This is well illustrated by the Banana-regulation : Germany actually voted against the regulation in the Council but was nonetheless bound by it, and had then to solve the massive fundamental rights problems that arose  at home as a result. More generally speaking: Extending QMV also means that governments may no longer be able to act as guardians of certain interests in the Council. To the extent that these interests are well enough established to be covered by constitutional law (as fundamental rights are, for example), the national courts may be forced into a more activist role as defenders of these interests against the EU, in particular when these interests can be designated integration-proof elements of national constitutional law.
2. Open questions
Neither national nor European judiciary are at the centre of the constitutional debate. The judiciary is hardly mentioned on the Conventions agenda for 2002/2003 at all. It is only at a very late stage that a forum for debating ECJ-related questions was introduced, albeit with a rather limited mandate. There are, however, numerous questions about the future of the courts which need answering. There is not only the question already touched upon supra of how to establish a concept of the common good in a European Union in which a complementary structure of the constitution (in the sense of multilevel constitutionalism) obtains. There are also foreseeable logistical and infrastructural obstacles to a functioning ECJ in an EU of 25 or more Member States, with possible side effects for European constitutional law adjudication in the entire EU. These obstacles include the language problem  and the question of how to ensure a balanced composition of the Court and its component parts based on equal representation of Member States.
More generally, one may question whether the Laeken-declaration agenda, which includes such topics as the legal status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights or the delimitation of competencies, does not perhaps deflect attention from more urgent, fundamental questions of European law. A political decision on the range and limits of the (common) market, for example, might be considered more pressing. This issue does not only concern social and cultural specifics of the Member States, but also fundamental choices of a society on the market-state relationship, taking into consideration social and other preferences. The ECJ’s Preussen-Elektra judgment illustrates in the area of the relationship between free movement of goods and environmental protection that, in spite of the Keck-jurisprudence, the ECJ is finding it increasingly difficult to remain consistent in its case law on the limits of the market. 
The codification of the ECJ’s case law on fundamental principles of European law such as direct effect, indirect effect of directives, state-liability under the Francovich-principles etc. would certainly be a rewarding task for the Convention and the ensuing IGC. Of primary importance as regards Treaty reform, is on the one hand the establishment of a comprehensive competence of the ECJ to adjudicate in the so-called intergovernmental areas, extending to acts of the European Council, and on the other hand the clarification of the extent to which European law enjoys supremacy over national law.  
An analysis of European constitutional law adjudication is closely linked to the more general question, which reaches beyond the EU, of how to conceptualise public power in an era in times of globalisation and internationalisation. Similar frictional phenomena as detected between the Member States and the EU may occur there, with similar lines of conflict. The ECJ may find itself in a position vis-à-vis courts or other adjudicating bodies outside the EU, which resembles the position national courts have adopted towards the ECJ. Moreover, there are numerous new fundamental questions, ranging from the question of how to tame new, previously unknown threats to individual freedom relating to economic power, to the question of how to legitimise new forms of governance. The answers to these questions will also affect the role and the function of national and supranational courts. 
Summary and conclusion
The analysis of the conflicts between the highest courts and tribunals at the European and Member State levels goes far beyond the mere relationship between these courts. Looking at this relationship offers more general insights about how Member States deal with the tension between their national legal orders and European legal order and where the crucial points for potential conflict are located within the European construct. Beyond the law, national courts also reflect changes in mood or opinion, regarding European integration, within the respective Member States. The differences and conflicts between the courts can be considered representative of more general trends and differences of opinion.
In all, it is probably a little premature to regard the relationship between the ECJ and the highest national courts and tribunals to be a consolidated relationship, but it is on the right path, heading towards a complementary structure of European constitutional law adjudication. This path is characterised by embracing cooperation instead of collision and by elements of a constitutional conversation between the courts, sometimes quite indirect, and variant in its characteristics, depending on the Member State in question. However, it remains to be seen, whether the constitutional debate in the aftermath of the Nice Treaty and next round of enlargement in 2004, will somehow serve to hinder this positive development. 
Thus, in these times of change in Europe, what is true for European integration in general applies likewise to the relationship between the courts: when facing crucial decisions, all-important is to preserve and secure what has already been achieved. Offering concepts and ideas to this end is not the only, but a particularly befitting task for the science of European constitutional law.  

Index 

acts breaking out. See ultra vires acts 
Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio, 2, 7
Areios Pagos, 2, 7
ausbrechende Rechtsakte. See ultra vires acts 
Austria, 2
Banana-regulation, 37, 40
Belgium, 2
borderline institutions (Grenzorgane), 25
bridge, German act of assent as. See Brückentheorie
Brückentheorie, 10
Bulgaria, 19
Bundesverfassungsgericht. See BVerfG
BVerfG, 1
and non-references of regular national courts, 13
and the German act of assent, 10
as a model and reference point for other courts, 36
Banana decision, 12
cooperation with the ECJ, 14, 26
EEC-Treaty as a constitution, 10
Kloppenburg decision, 1, 3, 13
Maastricht decision, 5, 12, 13
NPD decision, 5
references to the ECJ, 5
right of access to the lawful judge, 7, 13
Solange I, 5, 11
Solange I (dissenting opinion), 11
Solange II, 12
Vielleicht decision, 5
candidate states. See new and prospective Member States
Certification procedure, 23, 24
comity, 9, 24
common good, European, 37
competence control, political, 22
competence court, 39
ECJ as competence court, 22
proposals by BVerfG judges, 21
competencies, 39
compound constitution, 28
compound of states. See Staatenverbund
compound republic, 31
Conseil constitutionnel, 2
Conseil d’Etat, 2, 6
Cohn-Bendit decision, 3, 16
constitution
and non-statal entities, 29
as intercultural negotiation, 35
constitution composée, 28
constitutional complaint (Grundrechtsbeschwerde), 37, 39
Constitutional Council, 21
constitutional courts and supreme courts, 1
Austria, 2
Belgium, 2
Bulgaria, 19
comparability, 36
complementary structure, 34
convergence in Europe, 35
Cyprus, 18
Czech Republik, 18
Denmark, 2
Estonia, 18
Finland, 2
France, 2
Germany, 2
Great Britain, 2
Greece, 2
Hungary, 18
Ireland, 2
Latvia, 18
Lithuania, 18
Luxemburg, 2
Malta, 18
Netherlands, 2
new and prospective Member States, 18
Poland, 18
Portugal, 2
Romania, 19
Slovakia, 19
Slovenia, 18
Spain, 2
Sweden, 2
Turkey, 19
constitutional discourse, 22
constitutionalisation and WTO, 30
Convention, 39
competencies, 39
cooperation between BVerfG and ECJ. See BVerfG
Corte Costituzionale, 2
controlimiti, 17
Fragd, 16, 19
Frontini, 16, 19
Giampaoli, 5
Messagero Servizi, 6
Council of State (Greece). See Symvoulio Epikrateias
Cour Constitutionnelle (Luxemburg), 6
Cour d’arbitrage, 2, 6
Commune de Lanaken, 16
Cour de cassation, 2
court of competence, 21
Union Court of Review, 21
courts, 1
courts in the EU, 1
Cyprus, 18
Czeck Republik, 18
Denmark, 2
Doppelverfassung, 28
ECJ, 1
and indivduals, 36
and the ECHR, 41
and the highest national courts, 1
as a constitutional court, 36
as driving force behind European integration, 9, 39
CILFIT, 4
common good, 37
constitutional complaint (Grundrechtsbeschwerde), 37
Costa/ENEL, 9, 10, 36
democratic legitimacy, 37
election of judges, 37
Foto-Frost, 8
frictions with national courts, 19, 38
language problem, 41
monopoly of jurisdiction, 8
reform, 41
relationship of cooperation, 26
standard of scrutiny, 39
the EC Treaty as a constitution, 10
Union citizen’s court, 37
UPA, 36
Elegktiko Synedrio, 2, 7
Estonia, 18
European Conflicts Tribunal, 21
European constitution, 27
European constitutional law
and solidarity, 38
European constitutional law adjudication, 1
asymmetry, 35
theories, 35
European Constitutional Tribunal, 21
European Supreme Court, 21
federalism, 29
Finland, 2
France, 2
fundamental freedoms
limits of the market, 41
social and cultural specifics, 41
Fundamental Rights Charter, 39
Gemeinsamer Senat der obersten Bundesgerichte, 2
globalisation, 41
governance, 34, 39, 41
Greece, 2
Grundnorms, conflict of, 25
Grundrechtsbeschwerde. See constitutional complaint
guardian of the constitution, 8
Hoge Raad, 2, 6
Högsta domstolen, 2, 7
Højesteret, 2, 6
Rasmussen (Maastricht), 16
House of Lords, 2, 6
Hungary, 18
infringement proceedings
and national courts, 4
Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004, 38
internationalisation, 41
Ireland, 2
abortion, 20, 23
Italy, 2
controlimiti, 17
joint-decision trap (Politikverflechtung), 32
judicial federalism, 23
Korkein hallinto-oikeus, 2, 7
Korkein oikeus, 2, 7
Lagrådet, 2, 7
Latvia, 18
Lithuania, 18
Luxemburg, 2
Maastricht decision of the German BVerfG. See BVerfG
Malta, 18
Montesquieu, 1
multilevel common good, 38
multilevel constitutionalism. See Verfassungsverbund
multilevel system, 32
and courts, 34
and hierarchy, 33
level metaphor, 32
multilevel systems
definition, 33
multiplicity, 35
national constitutional identity, 24
national identities of the Member States, 24
Netherlands, 2
new and prospective Member States, 18
constitutional courts, 18
New Institutionalism, 30
parallel interpretation of European law, 18, 19
Perustuslakivaliokunta, 2, 7
Poland, 18
political safeguards of federalism, 23
Portugal, 2
preliminary references under Art. 234(3) EC, 3
and national authorities, 8
BVerfG, 5
CILFIT, 4
prostration, 23
public power, 33
qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers
extension, 40
Raad van State, 2, 6
Regeringsrätten, 2, 7
regime theory, 34
right of access to the lawful judge, 5, 7
Romania, 19
Slovakia, 19
Slovenia, 18
source of European law, 10, 34
sovereignty, 29
Spain, 2
Staatenverband, 30
Staatenverbund, 30
state and statehood
as central complex of German constitutional psychology, 29
Subsidiarity committee. See competencies, political control
supranational federation, 29
supranational union, 31
supremacy of European law, 9, 23, 41
and national identity, 24
critics, 9
ECJ, 9
new and prospective Member States, 19
prostration, 23
supremacy-proof national law, 35
Supreme Court (Ireland), 2, 6
Campus-Oil, 18
Grogan, 16
Supreme Court (USA), 23
Sweden, 2
Symvoulio Epikrateias, 2, 7
DI.K.A.T.S.A., 16
Treaty of Nice
Laeken declaration, 38
Tribunal Constitucional (Portugal), 2, 6
Tribunal Constitucional (Spain), 2
APESCO, 6
FOGASA, 4, 6
Maastricht-opinion, 16
Tribunal des Conflits, 2
Turkey, 19
ultimate decision on European law, 1
ultimate umpire, 1
ultra vires acts, 13, 14, 15, 26
Union Court of Review, 21
USA
Certification procedure, 23
court of competence, 21
Federalist Papers, 31
judicial federalism, 23
political safeguards of federalism, 23
Union Court of Review, 21
Verfassungsgerichtshof (Austria), 2, 7
Verfassungsverbund, 28, 31
and courts, 34
WTO, 30