The Jean Monnet Working Papers > 2003 Jean Monnet Papers


No.14/03

Author: Paul Magnette

Title: Coping with constitutional incompatibilities Bargains and Rhetoric in the Convention on the Future of Europe

Abstract:

While acknowledging that the European Convention was merely dominated by strategic behaviors, like former treaty changes, this paper examines the role played by arguments in the process. It first shows that the Laeken mandate comprised rules which could be used by the majority of the conventioneers to promote a deliberative norm. It then analyses, using Perelman's Treaty of argumentation, the different kinds of arguments used by the conventionneers to solve incompatibilities, and stresses the major role played by the "rhetoric of simplification". It concludes that, although these formalist arguments proved inefficient where questions of power were at stake, the potential long-term effect of this deliberative process should not be neglected.

Download: PDF * | RTF**


* The free viewer (Acrobat Reader) for PDF file is available at the Adobe Systems.

** rtf is a (more or less) universally readable format. Just download the file, which can be opened in most word processors.

   
 
Browse
 
Home
2003
Order Hard Copies
Search the Paper Series
How to cite the Papers
Help with Printing the Papers
 
Top

Last updated on September 9th, 2004